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remedy to the wife and next of kin, and the husband has no right of action under it
for the killing of his wife. Lucas vs. N. Y. Central R. R. Co. 21 Barb. 245; Worley vs. C. H. & D. R. R. Co. 1 Handy's Superior Ct. of Cin. 481; Penn. R. R. Co.
vs. M'Closkey, 23 Penn. State, 526. In Massachusetts and New Hampshire, the
remedy given to the parties pecuniarily interested in the life of a person unlawfully
killed, is by a fine recoverable by indictment prosecuted by the State against the
wrong-doer for the benefit of the parties designated by the statute ; and this remedy
only being provided, an action for damages cannot be sustained. The act of Massachusetts confines its remedy to fatal injuries suffered by a passenger from the
defaults of certain classes of common carriers; and that of New Hampshire to those
arising from the defaults of the proprietors of railroads. In New Hampshire it is
held that the indictment must be against the corporation, and not against the individual stockholders, and must show that there are persons living entitled to the
fine. State vs. Gilmore, 4 Foster, 461; B. C. & If. I. R. Co. vs. The State, 32 N.
H. 215; Carey vs. Berkshire R. R. Co. 1 Cush. 475; Skinner vs. Housatonic R. R.
Corp. id; Pierce on Railroads, 257. 1 Tidd's Pract., p. 9. Note A. 4th Am. ed.,
where the legislation of a number of the states is collected: Consult Redfield on
Railways, 336, and particularly the notes on pp. 337, 338, 339, 340, and the very
late case of Coakley vs. The North Penn. R. R. 6 Am. L. Reg. 355, opinion per
SraoNG, J.-Eds. Am. Law Bey.
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In th~e United States District (Jourt for the Southern Distriet of
New Fork, May Term, 1858.
WILLIAM E. COLLIS AND WILLIAM MITCHELL, VS. THE SCHOONER C(]RNINE,
FRALEY W. MOORE) SIMON J. LATHAN, AND LORENZO A. WEBB, CLAIMANTS.
1. Where the outfit and supply of materials for building and equipping a vessel, and
making her ready for sea, by furnishing ship-chandlery, sails, rigging, materials,
&c., were bought in New York, and sent to Plymouth, North Carolina, and used
by the vessel, which rendered her seaworthy, and enabled her to make voyages
and earn freight; it was held, in compliance with the decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States in Pratt vs. Reid, 19. How. 359, and Jefferson vs.
Beers, 20 How. 393, that no admiralty lien existed, and no jurisdiction attached in
the Court of Admiralty.
2. A contract made in a port of the United States, to construct a vessel in a port of
another state, by actually building her or by supplying materials for such construction, is not a maritime contract, creating a-lien upon the vessel for the value
of the materials, supplies, or labor, which is enforceable in the Admiralty.
3. Pratt v& Reid, 19. How. 359, and Jefferson vs. Beers, 20 How. 393, commented on.
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The libellants, ship-chandlers and traders, residents and doing
business in New York, were in the habit of dealing on credit in the
line of their trade with Gilbert L. Moore, a resident of Williamston,
in North Carolina, engaged in building and sailing vessels, and other
transactions, in that State.
The correspondence between those parties proves that such course
of dealing was in use between them anterior to the month of September, 1856, and was continued subsequently on open accounts of debit
and credit. At that time, in an interview between them in New
York, it was agreed that the libellants should supply the equipments
and outfits necessary to complete the schooner Cbernine, which
Moore was about constructing at his residence in North Carolina;
and that they should furnish whatever should be required to that
end upon the written or verbal orders of Moore.
On the 5th of March, 1857, Moore wrote the libellants from
Williamston by Samuel D. Hines, introducing the latter as the intended master of the Cernine when completed, and requesting that his
memoranda of materials and supplies should be filled by the libellants
"at as low rates as possible," the large amounts of course on the
regular times, "in order to give the vessel some time to make a port
before it is due ;" "the small memoranda of which I shall expect to
pay between one and three months ;" for instance "the bill for
making sails, iron works, &c." The same letter had advised the
libellants that Moore would, between July and September, pay them
a considerable amount for the purchase of the sails and rigging for
the icernine; those, as it appears from the correspondence between
the parties, being articles not dealt in by the libellants, but with
some others were to be purchased by them in New York for Moore.
By letters of dates of March 14 and 20, the libellants advised
Moore that they were hastening to fulfill all Hines' orders; that
hemp, sails, blocks, &c., had been purchased by them. On the 18th
March they further wrote that all the goods were then ready, and
requested a remittance of funds, as they had to make large purchases,
and their payments for duck, &c., " then, and for the next sixjy days,
will be heavy."
By letter of April 8, the libellants informed Moore that the goods
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were all on board the vessel at New York, for transportation to
North Carolina, and that they inclose "bill of lading and amount of
supplies, amounting in all to $4,074 35," "the cash bills, amounting
to $916 77,"they desired him to remit immediately.
On the 11th July, 1856, Moore executed at North Carolina, a
promissory note to the libellants, or order for $600, payable at ninety
days, and on the 81st of July, at the same place, another note for
the same amount ($600,) payable in ninety days thereafter to the
libellants, or order; and on the 24th of September, following, another
promissory note, dated at New York, payable to libellants or order
for $1,000, four months after date.
These several promissory notes were produced in open court by
the counsel for the libellants on the hearing of the cause, as having
been given for the debt in prosecution, and were delivered up to be
cancelled.
It appeared in proof that the materials supplied by the libellants
were necessary for the construction and use of the schooner, and could
not have been procured at the place where she was built and fitted
out. They were supplied for her service, and after her completion
she was dispatched by Moore, her owner, from Plymouth, North
Carolina, her port of registry, upon a series of foreign voyages.
June 2-, 1857, she sailed for Guadeloupe, thence to Marie Galante,
thence to St. Pierre, Martinique, thence to the Island of Nevis, on
trading voyages ; thence to St. Thomas, where she was chartered
for Porto Rico and New York, at which last place she arrived in the
month of August, remained in the port fifteen days at Qqarantine,
and eight days afterward in discharging and reloading, and on the
22d day of September sailed again on round charters by the way of
the West Indies back to New York, where she arrived Jan. 26, 1858,
and the libel in this cause was filed the next day. The libellants
were personally apprised of the vessel being in this port within two
or three days after her first arrival here, and also knew the whole
period of her continuance in port. The libellants charged that the
schooner being in Wilmington, N. C., and in want of ship chandlery,
sails, rigging, materials, labor and supplies, to render her seaworthy
and fit to navigate the high seas and proceed upon a voyage to the
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*West Indies, they furnished and delivered such articles to the vessel
at that place, &c. These claimants intervened and set up a title to
the vessel under an assignment of her in trust for the payment of
debts made to them by Gilbert L. Moore prior to the commencement of this action; and by formal answer they denied every material
allegation in the libel upon which the action is based. They especially denied the jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter,
and insisted on the argument upon an explicit judgment upon that
branch of the defence, because of its eminent importance to the
interests of navigation and commerce in American vessels, and
because it is supposed the law governing that subject is obscure or
indefinite in its provisions, or has become seemingly so, under the
rules by which it is interpreted and administered by the courts.
There was also a separate intervention and defence to the action
in the name of James C. Willett, Sheriff of the City and County of
New York, who interposed and claimed the vessel by virtue of process of
attachment out of a state court in favor of a creditor of Gilbert L.
Moore, the alleged owner of the schooner. This branch of the defence
was disposed of at the last May term of the court, on an issue in
law (24 vol, MSS. Decisions, 40,) and will not be further regarded
in the report of this case. The case was argued upon the pleadings
and proofs by Messrs. N. Hoxie, and E. C. Benedict, for libellants,
and Messrs. Gerard, Jr., and B. D. Silliman for claimants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BETTS, J.-The libellants place their right of action in this cause
upon the grounds that the transaction between them and Gilbert L.
Moore, in relation to the outfit and supply of materials for building
and equipping the schooner Cwernine, was a maritime contract, concerning a foreign vessel, her employment in navigation and commerce,
and that a debt, was thereby created, which became by implication
of law a lien upon the vessel, accompanying her wherever she went;
or that by the local law of North Carolina, under which she was
built, registered and owned, and where the supplies' were used, the
schooner was made subject to a lien for that debt, which, by the
principles of the general maritime law, is enforceable in this court.
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The position on the part of the claimants is, that this Court has
no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit in any aspect of
the case under which it is presented by the pleadings and proofs,
and the cases of Prattvs. Reid, 19 How. R., 359, and the claimants
of the steamboat Jefferson vs. Beers et al., 20 How. 393, are relied
upon as having settled, by the solemn adjudications of the Supreme
Court, the law definitely to that effect.
In view of the magnitude of interests depending upon the general
question in this district, and its importance practically in the everyday business dealings within the port, between mechanics and material
men, and shipowners and masters, it is deemed desirable that this
specific point should be made the prominent subject of consideration
and decision; especially if those judgments of the Supreme Court
have worked any change in the rules heretofore applied to this class
of cases, and have diminished the securities formerly enforced in
this court in behalf of that order of creditors.
In the first place, it is important to consider what were the special
features in the case of Prattvs. Reid, adjudged upon by the Supreme
Court, and what character was affixed by that decision to the contract or credit in regard to the necessaries supplied a foreign vessel
on a voyage, in order to give them a privilege or lien against the
vessel.
The steamboat Sultana was employed on the Western Lakes, in
the transportation of passengers and freight. She was enrolled and
owned at Buffalo, and a debt was contracted at Erie, in Pennsylvania,
by her owner and master, for supplies of coal to her during the performance of a succession of trips for a period of about two years.
It was assumed by the court to have been necessary for the navigation of the vessel that she should be furnished with coal on those
occasions, although the proof on that head was held to be loose and
indefinite. The lilbellant furnished her coal in that manner
when demanded, from June 1852, to May 1854, and rendered a
bill therefor, containing a running account of debits and credits.
The owner of the boat usually navigated her as master, and was present when the supplies were furnished. When he was not present
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they were furnished at the request of the person.in command. The
answer denied that the supplies were furnished on the credit of the
boat, and averred they were furnished on the credit of the master.
The court laid out of view the inadequacy of proof that the supply
of coal was an actual necessity to the navigation of the vessel, within
the admiralty rule, at the time it was supplied her, because of the
more serious difficulty in the case of the libellant, in the absence of
any proof to show that there was also a necessity at the time of procuring the supplies for a credit upon the vessel, which was asserted
by the court to be essential as that of the necessity of the article
itself. It seems to be supposed, the court remarks, "that circumstances of less pressing necessity for supplies or repairs, and an
implied hypothecation of the vessel to procure them, will satisfy the
rule, than in# case of necessity sufficient to justify a loan of money
on bottomry for the like purpose. We think this a misapprehension."
The court proceeds to fortify the position of law taken by them
on those facts, by reasoning against the sufficiency of the facts to
authorize an implication of a lien in the case, and by an intimation
strongly disfavoring the increase of maritime liens of this class, upon
the lakes and rivers, as tending to perplex and embarrass business
rather than furnish facilities to carry it forward, and declaring that
such liens should be strictly limited to the necessities of commerce
which created them.
The jurisdiction of the court over the question is one and the
same when it concerns the business of commerce and navigation
between ports and places in different States and Territories upon
the lakes and navigable waters connecting the lakes, as is possessed
and exercised in case the vessels are employed in navigation and
commerce upon the high seas or tide waters within the Admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction of the United States. Act of Congress,
Feb. 26, 1845, 5 Statutes at Large, 726.
The similitude, and indeed identity, of the present case with that
of Pratt vs. Beid, in their leading features, appears thug to be
nearly exact. In both instances the supplies and necessaries were
obtained in ports of States foreign to those in which the vessels
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respectively belonged, and were procured through the direct contract
and orders of the owner, who also, in each case, was master of the
vessel at the time. In neither case was there any stipulation for
direct payment of the purchase prices at the time of purchase, nor
any terms of credit agreed upon between the parties. The decision
in Pratt vs. Reid, therefore, in no way rested upon a question of
implied authority in a master to pledge a vessel on such a credit,
because the dealing was by the owner directly; but the controlling
consideration which governed the case was, that however iminent
the necessity of the vessel for the supplies might be, the case could
not be brought within the cognizance of the federal court, unless
it appeared that the necessity was equally urgent that the responsibility of the vessel should be pledged for payment.
It seems to me, therefore, that the case of Pratt vs. Reid, is
susceptible of no other interpretation than that an implied lien for
stores, materials, supplies or outfits of any kind, can never be raised
against an American vessel in the courts of the United States upon
the mere fact that they were furnished her on credit out of her home
port, and are necessary to her navigation and employment. The
further fact must be shown that the supplies could not be obtained
on the personal credit of her owners. That principle covers and
negatives every claim to a hypothecation of the schooner in security
of the debt in the present case. It is unnecessary to go further and
say the doctrine of the decision significantly implies, that the act
of the owner of the vessel in personally incurring the debt and
obtaining the credit, has no higher effect in imparting a lien than
the act of a master solely, for the entire dealing in that case appears
to have been conducted or sanctioned personally by the owner
himself.
The particulars in which the present case is distinguishable from
that, weaken instead of strengthen the presumption that both parties
contemplated at the time of the sale and purchase of the materials
furnished by the libellants any lien therefor upon the schooner; but
for the reasons before suggested, I do not recapitulate and press
the considerations arising out of the pleadings and proofs tending to
show that no liability against the vessel was in view of the parties
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at the time, and that the dealing was most probably on the footing
of their accustomed transactions, and wholly one of personal credit.
One distinction, however, ought not to be passed by, which is, that
the materials, labor, &c., obtained in this case were not for the
necessary repair of this schooner, but were for her original construction, she then being on the stocks in a course of building.
It is intended to dispose of this case in subordination to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the two recent cases referred to, and
to restrain it carefully within the fair and plain import of the doctrines laid down in those decisions, without any inquiry into the correspondence or disaccord of those judgments, or either of them, with
the rule of law antecedently prevailing in maritime courts upon
those subjects. It is not the province of this court to canvass the
reasons upon which these decisions are founded, or attempt to measure their validity by any supposed inconsistency or incongruity
with prior doctrines of the Supreme Court. They stand the final
existing law which governs analogous facts coming within their just
scope and meaning.
The People's Ferry Company of Boston, Claimantsof the Steamboat Jefferson, Appellants, vs. Joseph Beers and -David Warner,
Assignees of B. C. Terry, was a case decided by the Supreme
Court in December term, 1857, and reported in 20 How. 893. A
vessel owned in New Jersey was built and supplied with materials
in that State by the libellants, residents in New York, on credit and
without any express pledge of the vessel for the debt.
The propositions of law determined by the court, and the facts to
which they are applied, are especially stated by the judge who delivered the opinion of the court.
"1The only matter in controversy is (say the court) whether the
district courts of the United States have jurisdiction to proceed in
admiralty to enforce liens for labor and materials furnished in construccing vessels to be employed in the navigation of waters to which
the admiralty jurisdiction extends."
"We have the simple case," continues the judge, " whether these
ship-carpenters had a lien for work and materials that can be enforced
in rem in admiralty.
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"1The question presented involves a contest between the State and
federal government. The latter has no power or jurisdiction
beyond what the constitution confers. The contest here is not so
much between rival tribunals as between distinct sovereignties
claiming to exercise power over contracts, property and personal
franchises."
"What were meant in 1789 by ' cases of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction,' must be meant now. What was reserved to the States
to be regulated by their own institutions, cannot be rightfully
infringed by the general government, either through its legislative
or judicial department.
"The contract (in the case) is simply for building the hull of a ship
and delivering it on the water. ' She was constructed and delivered
according to the contract.' ' The admiralty jurisdiction is limited
to contracts, claims and services purely maritime, and touching rights
and duties appertaining to commerce and navigation.' Judge Hopkinson, in 1781, declared as respect ship-builders, that the practice
of former times doth not justify the admiralty's taking cognizance
of their suits: I We feel warranted in saying that at no time since
this has been an independent nation has such a practice been allowed."
The judge said, "it is proper, however, to notice the fact, that
district courts have recognized the existence of admiralty jurisdiction
in rem'against a vessel to enforce a carpenter's bill for work and
materials in constructing it, in cases where a lien had been created
by the local law of the State where the vessel was built. Thus far,
however, in our judicial history, no case of the kind has been sanctioned by this court."
This adjudication very explicitly determines that a contract in a
port of one of the United States to construct a vessel in a port of
another State by actually building her or supplying materials for
such construction is not a maritime contract creating a lien upon
the vessel, for the value of the labor or supplies, which can be enforced
in a federal court. That the debt or contract does not make a case
of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction within the meaning of the
constitution and laws of the United States, and if it may be any
way cognizable in those tribunals, it is only so by force of State
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legislation, imposing the debts as a lien on the vessel, which obligation the national court executes and carries into effect;- but' the
same judgment emphatically declares that no instance of such proceedings which appear to have occurred in some of the inferior
national courts has been sanctioned by the Supreme Court.
I had never supposed the jurisdiction of the United States District Courts over this class of liens was imparted by State legislation,
or that those tribunals could in any way derive judicial competency
or jurisdiction from State grant; and without being restrained by
the significant intimation of the Supreme Court, I should not be any
way inclined to administer affirmatively, as the foundation of a right
and remedy in admiralty, any enactment by a State legislature.
Considering that the decision last referred to, withdraws from the
cognizance of this court the subject matter of the present action as
not being one of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, I deem it
wholly useless and extrajudicial to inquire whether the statute of
North Carolina, put in evidence in this cause, is applicable in its
provisions to the contract and debt now in suit, or is of any force
out of the territorial jurisdiction of that State. The -labor claimed
by the libellants to have been furnished this schooner in North
Carolina must be understood to be the work of builders, personally
or by their agents, and falls directly within the judgmnt of the court,
as not a claim of a maritime character.
The latest decision of the Supreme Court upon a legal question
within its jurisdiction, settles for the government of all inferior judicatories the practical meaning and force of the proposition so determined; and it is no part of the function of subordinate courts to
adjudge or even inquire whether such determination comports with
or subverts antecedent judgments of the same forum upon similiar
questions. The last decision is practically the final one.
Neither of the two cases last passed -upon by the Supreme Court
in relation to implied liens in favor of material men and laborers,
against American vessels in American ports, demanded the direct
and broad answer to the inquiry whether those liens exist pr can
be enforced in the federal courts in any form, by virtue of the
general maritime law; but the principles announced by the court ia
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those cases render it quite palpable that scarcely another advance
remains to be made in order to abrogate that remedy absolutely and
reinstate and restrict the admiralty powers of the judiciary in respect
to those credits, in subordination to the rule 6f the common law as
that was administered under the English jurisprudence at the time
of the adoption of the United States Constitution.
It is my province to accept and pursue the law as declared by the
Supreme Court; and in my opinion the rule established by that
tribunal in those cases determines that the claim put forth in this
action either for building, or constructing, or outfitting, or providing
materials, supplies, labor, rigging, or ship stores necessary to render
this vessel seaworthy and fit for navigation at sea; is not within the
jurisdiction of the court, and accordingly the libel must be dismissed,
with costs.
The amount in demand being sufficient to authorize an appeal of
the case to the court of last resort, I put the decision specifically
upon the question of jurisdiction, that being directly involved, and
being of high practical moment to the mercantile, manufacturing
and shipping interest of the country, and shall forbear discussing
those other features in the case bearing strongly against the adequacy
of the pleadings and proofs to sustain the action in this form, if the
cases of Prattvs. Reid, and the Ferry Company of Boston, claimant;
of the Jefferson vs. Beers, had interposed no legal impediment in the
suit.
Decree accordingly.

In the Supreme Court of Michigan.
THE AMERICAN TRANSPORTATION CO. PL'FFS IN ERROR VS. MOORE, :FOOTE
AND CO. DEF'TS IN ERROR.

1. Where an action was brought for the non-delivery of certain goods entrusted to
the owners of the propeller Spaulding, which were put on board at Buffalo to be
transported to Detroit, and which were accidentally burned without negligence,
it was held that, inasmuch as the loss occurred on a lake vessel engaged in commerce within the jurisdiction of Congress, the owners of the propeller were
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exonerated from liability under the act of March 8, 1851, passed to limit the
liability of ship owners.
2. A limitation alleged by a carrier as one of the terms of his contract, is a question of fact, and must be shown affirmatively before a jury.
8. The history of maritime legislation in England and in this country.
4. The history of maritime legislation as applied to the commerce of the great
lakes.
6. Lake commerce is, in its nature, maritime, and as such has been recognized by
the Federal Government.

Moore, Foote & Co., sued the American 'Transportation Company
for the non-delivery of certain goods entrusted to the company, to
be transported from New York to Detroit. The goods were accidentally burned on board of the propeller Spaulding, belonging to
the company, having been put on board at Buffalo to be carried to
Detroit. The grounds of defence to the action were, first, that by
the original contract of carriage, the owner of the goods was to bear
all risks of fire during the whole route; and second, that, inasmuch
as the loss occurred upon a lake vessel engaged in commerce within
the jurisdiction of Congress, the owners of the vessel were exonerated
from liability, under the act of Congress of 1851, passed to limit
the liability of ship owners. Upon the question of liability under
the original contract, the court was asked to charge in several different particulars, involving a construction of the law as applicable to
facts attending this agreement and the subsequent shipment, and
exceptions were taken to the charges given. Upon the question
arising under the act of Congress, the court charged the jury that
lake commerce did not come within the intention of the statute, but
must be considered as "' inland,' within the exception of the act.
Judgment was given for the plaintiffs, and the case was brought up
on writ of error and exceptions for review.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
CAMPBELL, J.-The errors assigned in this case arise upon the
action of the court below in charging and refusing to charge.
The requests, made by the defendant below (who is plaintiff in
in error,) number 1, 2 and 3, were properly refused by the 'Courts.
Whether the merchant in New York, shipping goods to Moore
Foote & Co., had authority to make contracts for shipment on dif-
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ferent terms from those ordinarily adopted by common carriers, was
a question of fact, and the court could not properly be asked to
make any charge which should absolutely dispose of a fact in controversy. The whole depended on the terms of agency.
We think the 2d instruction asked by the plaintiff below, and
given by the court, is too broad and unqualified, and would naturally
tend to mislead a jury. It was taken literally from the opinion of
ihe United States Supreme Court in the case of the New Jersey
Steam. Navigation Co. vs. Mercl ants' Bank, 6 How. R. 344. But
as it appears there, it is considerably qualified by the context.
And it was propounded there as an independent abstract legal proposition requiring no explanation. While it is true that it devolves
upon a carrier to show affirmatively the terms of any contract which
lessens his common law liability, yet that fact is to be proved like,
any other, by any pertinent evidence. If in writing, the writing
must be shown; but if by parol, there is no rule which requires
different proof from thatwhich would establish any other contract.
It does not matter that the evidence is conflicting, for in civil cases
the jury must always decide upon the weight of evidence; and there
is no rule (except where turpitude or illegality is in issue) which
requires one contract to be proven by more or different testimony
than another. The jury in each case must be satisfied that a certain
contract exists; and if satisfied, that is sufficient. In Walker vs.
the York and North Midland Bailway Co., 22 Eng. L. &Eq. 315;
where a plaintiff had been notified that a company would not be
responsible for certain risks, and objected to the notice and claimed.
that it was not binding on him, and subsequently forwarded goods.
by the line, it was held that it was proper to instruct a jury that
they might infer an agreement on the part of the plaintiff to such
terms unless a clear refusal on his part was shown, and also an
acquiescence by the company in such refusal. This case is cited
with approbation and given as an example in a very able essay on
the theory of implied contracts, reprinted from the London LawMagazine in 4 American Law Register, p. 321.
We also think the third instruction given was erroneous. The unsigned memorandum was no contract in any sense of the term, and could
2
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only be made available as embodied by reference in some written or
parol agreement, which should adopt it. We think there was nothing
in the case to found any such charge upon. There was no evidence
showing, or tending to show, a written contract of the kind mentioned
in that charge, and the charge was, therefore, improper, as tending
to mislead the jury. Toulmin vs. Headley, 2 Carr. & Kirw. 157.
The principal controversy in this case, and one which goes to the
entire merits, is that raised by the fourth request of the defendant
below, touching the character of lake navigation, within the purview
of the act of Congress entitled "An Act to limit the liability of ship
owners, and for other purposes, approved March 8d, 1851"-9 Stat.
U. S. 635. It is claimed by the plaintiff in error that the owners
of vessels thus employed are not liable for losses on board by fire
occurring without fault or negligence; while the defendants in error
insist that such vessels come within the exceptions to the statute,
and are in the eye of the law, engaged in "inland navigation."
The first section of the act exempts the owners "of any ship or
vessel" from liability for loss or damage to goods shipped, by reason
of fire happening on board, without the design or neglect of the
owners, with a proviso allowing the parties to make such special
contracts as they may see fit. The second section exempts the
master and owners from any liability for certain valuable articles,
when not made known and entered on the bill of lading truly;
and in all cases limits the liability of such goods to the entered
valuation. The third section limits the liability of any owner for
any occurance happening without his privity or knowledge, to the
value of his interest in the ship, and freight. The fourth section provides a method of equitable apportionment, where the value of the ship
and freight falls short of the losses. The fifth section makes the
charterers owners during the charter, for the purposes of the act.
The sixth section saves all remedies against master and crew. The
seventh section contains a penalty for shipping certain inflammable
and explosive articles in a general freight ship, without a written
note of the articles shipped. The latter clause of that sectionwhich is, in fact, a separate section-is as follows: "This act shall
not apply to the owner or owners of any canal boat, barge, or lighter,
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or to any vessel of any description whatsoever, used in rivers or
inland navigation."
The question raised here is one which has never been passed upon
'by any court of last resort in this country, so far as we have been
informed; and its importance demands a very careful examination.
We propose, therefore, to view it in the light of the old law, and of
the maritime legislation of England, from which the statute in question was substantially, and, in most respects, literally derived.
The policy of England has long been to aid and encourage navigation. But, so far as the liabilities of ship owners as carriers were
concerned, they were left generally to be regulated by the bills of
lading. From the earliest times these have exempted vessels, not
only on account of the act of God, or of the public enemy, but from
all losses arising from "perils of the seas," a broad and comprehensive phrase, covering most casualties not attributable to negligence
of some kind in the officers or crew.-Although in some early
authorities, it is clearly intimated that fire is not a peril of the seas,
yet, as no case arose calling for the application of the doctrine, it
seems to have been lost sight of for a long time. In 1785 the first
reported decision occurred, holding inland carriers liable for loss
byfire. Forwardvs. Pittard,1 T. R. 86. In 1786, in consequence
of that decision, the statute 26 Geo. 3 ch. 86, was passed, whereby
the owners of any ship or vessel were exempted from liability for
loss by fire happening on board of the vessel, and their other liabilities were limited. This statute exempted no one but the owners
from this particular liability, and it has been customary to exempt
the master or charterers in such cases by the bill of lading. By the
statute 53 Geo. 3 ch. 159, certain other qualified exemptions were
made, (not referring to fire, however,) and this last act was, by its
terms, not to extend to "the owners of any lighter, barge, boat or
vessel, of any burden or description whatsoever, used solely in rivers
or inland navigation, or any ship or vessel not duly registered
according to law." It had been decided already that the previous
act did not apply to lighters. Hunter vs. feaowan 1 Bligh, R.
573. It was also intimated in the case of The -undee, 1 Hagg.
R. 1-13, that foreign vessels were not within these acts, which were
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passed for the benefit of British commerce. The same principle
was affirmed in the Girolamo, 3 Hagg. R. 187, and the Carl
JTohann, cited in the latter case. By 6 & 7 W. 4 ch. 61, the provisions of these acts, and of 7 Geo. 2, ch. i 5, (which was an earlier
act, tending in the same direction,) were declared to extend to
Ireland. The object of all this legislation is said, in Galevs. Lawrie,
5 B. & C.156, to be "to encourage persons to become owners of ships."
Holland had, at an earlier day, passed similar laws for the same
purpose; and by the marine ordinances of France, Book 2, title 4,
art. 2, it was provided as follows: "The owners of ships shall be
answerable for the deeds of the master, but shall be discharged,
abandoning their ship and freight;" in this respect conforming
entirely to the English statutes and the act of Congress in all cases
except fire-if, indeed, that is an exception; and such is the general
maritime law of Europe. 3 Kent's Com. 217, 218. It is worthy
of remark that, while by the English and American statutes, a
liability to the extent of his interest in the vessel and freight is
retained against the owner in all other cases where there was a common law liability, the exemption against fire is absolute and entire.
But while collusion might exist in other cases, fire on shipboard
could very rarely occur designedly; and, inasmuch as the maritime
law requires goods generally to be stowed below deck, the vessel
would commonly be destroyed by any fire which destroyed her cargo,
while in other cases, where damage occurs not within the legal
exemptions, the vessel may, and usually does, remain undestroyed.
There was no liability for fire without negligence, by the civil law.
Hunt vs. Morris, 6 Martin's La. R. 676.
It can require but a very slight comparison between our statute
of 1851 and the English acts, to ascertain that it was copied from
them. The general tenor is the same, and our law is referred to
this origin by Curtis, J., in the Manufacturing Co. vs. 3ark Tangier,
6 Am. Law Reg. June, 1858, where an action was brought for goods
burned. The peculiar term "rivers or inland navigation," which
led to some discussion before us in this case, and which, Judge
Conkling.in 1 Ad. Jur. 209, supposes to have been a clerical mistake,
is adopted literally from the act of 53 Geo. 3, above referred to.
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So far, therefore, as English authorities bear upon the subject under
consideration, they are worthy of attention. The same craft specifically exempted under 53 Geo. 3, are exempted by name in our
statute, which contains no more designation of particular vessels.
Some of the English pilot and river acts containing similar designations have .passed under the observation of the courts, and may also
be examined with profit.
It is quite evident from the tenor of the English legislation that
the intent of the acts referred to was to strengthen their commercial marine, by encouraging persons to invest their capital without the risk of ruin from those casualties which no ordinary care on
their part could prevent. Every owner could not be a master or
mariner, and self-interest would always prompt ship-owners to select
reliable officers and crews. There was great injustice in holding
the innocent owner for matters entirely beyond his control. While,
therefore, the master was still left, in most cases, liable as at common law, the owner was made exempt. But the reasons which made
such a relaxation necessary or expedient in the case of vessels
engaged in maritime commerce, did not apply with so much force
to the excepted list. The classes named in the exception are all
small vessels of burden, incapable from their nature of withstanding
the perils of the sea, and never in fact exposed to them. They are
not required to be navigated by expert seamen, and are never, or
but rarely beyond the reach of their owners, or of succor in peril.
It will be found that in the English courts, for these and other reasons, acts have been repeatedly construed with reference to one class
or the other by the character of the service or the class of vessels
designated, where the general terms used in addition would, in the
popular sense, or with another context, embrace both classes. The
case of ffunter vs. MJcaowan, already referred to, held that the
act of 26 Geo. 3, was inapplicable to lighters, although the terms
used were "any ship or vessel." But not only was the term "ship"
the governing phrase, from which a fair intent might be drawn that
"vessel" meant something of kindred employment, but the act
referring to bills of lading, masters and mariners and shippers, and
providing for an apportionment of loss in certain cases in a court
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of equity, the inference would be almost irresistible that the act had,
reference to maritime business, because all the phrases are maritime. The original report of this case is not at our command, but
it is frequently cited, and evidently went upon this ground. In
Blanford vs. Morrison, 15 Q. B. R. 724, under an act which
required a certain ticket or certificate for all coal delivered in London "by any lighter, vessel, barge or other craft," it was held that
a coal-brig, which brought coal coastwise from Newcastle, and delivered it at the wharf, was exempted from the penalty of the law,
which was held merely to apply to such vessels as were used to
unload coal from others, and did not apply to vessels in which it
was originally shipped. The discussion is quite full and instructive.
In Benyon vs. (reswell, 12 Q. B. R. 899, it was held that a vessel
under 15 tons burthen could not be registered, and that the registry
-was void. It had been registered, and the law required every transfer of property in a registered ship or vessel to be by a bill of sale
reciting the registry. No ship was by law to be deemed a British
ship without registry, but British built boats and vessels under 15 tons,
owned and navigated by British subjects, were to be admitted to be
British in all navigation "in the rivers and upon the coasts of the
United Kingdom." The court held that no vessel under 15 tons
could be registered at all. In Regina vs. Reed, 28 Eng. L. and Eq.,
133, it was decided that an act forbidding any person, not a freeman, to "act as waterman or lighterman, or navigate upon the
river Thames between Windsor and Ganlett Creek, any wherry,
lighter, or other craft," did not extend to a steam-tug; although by
Tisdale vs. Combe, 7 Ad. and Ell. 788, acts with a different wording, had been made applicable to passengers and freight river
steamers on the Thames. The case of Reed vs. _Ingham, 26 Eng.
L. and Eq. 164, holds the same doctrine with Regina vs. Reed,
deciding that the general words must be confined to vessels ejusdem
generis with those named, and that a steam-tug requires different
and greater skill to manage it in its occupation, from that required
for wherries, lighters, or similar craft.
These cases all tend to show that such statutes, when mentioning
expressly certain classes of vessels, and then using general words,
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intend to apply the latter to vessels ejusdem generis, either of build
or business, and not to extend the language beyond.
Besides the well understood meaning of "inland navigation" in
England, and the natural inference to be drawn from the use of the
vessels particularly named under the rules laid down in the cases
cited, some light may be drawn from the course of the English
courts in dealing with kindred maritime questions not immediately
applicable to these statutes so far as the exceptions are concerned.
In Battersby vs. Kicirk, 2 Bing., N. 0. 584, it was held that
Ireland was a place "beyond seas," in regard to the Bristol Dock
acts, as it had previously been decided under the statute of limitations. In -Davisonvs. McKibben, 6 loore 387, S. 0. 3 Brod. &
Bing. 112 ; it was held that a vessel engaged in general freighting
between Belfast and London, and which at the time the question
arose was proceeding down the Thames from London on her way
to Belfast, with a general cargo, was neither a "coasting vessel"
nor "an Irish trader, using the navigation of the river Thames as a
coaster." The statute of 6 Geo. 4, c. 107, declared that thereafter
all trade by sea from one part of the United Kingdom to another,
or from any part of the Isle of lan to another, should be deemed
to be coasting trade, in any matter relating to the trade or navigation or revenue of the realm, and all ships while employed therein
should be deemed coasting ships. The customs act of 8, 9, Vic., c.
86, sec. 113, contains the same provisions. In Shepherd vs. Hill,
32 Eng. L. and Eq., 533, it was held that vessels running between
a port in England and the channel Islands were not coasting Yessels,
because, although subject to Great Britain, they were no part of
the realm, and were not within those acts. And where a vessel had
come from Calcutta to London, and there discharged her cargo, and
thence proceeded in ballast to Liverpool, it was held that the voyage
from London to Liverpool was not a coasting voyage within the pilot
acts. The reason why coasting vessels were exempted from employing pilots, was because the masters, from their frequent voyages,
must become familiar with the navigation; and this reason did not
exist in favor of an East India ship. The Agricola, 2 W. Rob. 10.
And having employed a pilot, the ship owners were held not liable
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for a collision while he was on board. In Gatliffe vs. Bourne, 4
Bing. N. C. 814, S. C. Bourne vs. Gatliffe in Exch. Oh. 3 Mann.
& Gr. 64:2, where goods were shipped from Dublin to London, and
destroyed by fire after being landed on the wharf, it was admitted
in both courts that if the fire had happened on board, the exemption
of 26 Geo. 8 would have applied to save the owners from liability.
The cause of action arose several years after the Irish trade had
been embraced within the coasting trade. The only English case
reported arising directly under the act of 26 Geo. 8, is Morewood
vs. Pollock, 18 Eng. L. and Eq. 341, where goods were burned
upon a lighter in the harbor of Mobile while in transit from the
shore to an English vessel. It was urged that the lighter might be
considered as constructively a part of the ship, and that the goods
might thus be deemed "on board." The court, however, said "it
cannot be said that the lighter was a part of the ship at the time.
It belonged to other proprietors, and was employed for the particular
purpose of loading by the owners of the Barbara. To bring a case
within the act, the fire must, I think, be on board the vessel which
is the property of the owners, and that was not so here. Again,
the goods were not on board the ship of which the defendants were
the owners." And jugdment was given for the plaintiffs. This
case leaves it somewhat in doubt whether if the goods had been on
board of a lighter or shallop belonging to the ship, they might not
have been considered on board within the acts. The case of Johnson vs. Benson, 1 Brod. & Bing. 454, inclines that way upon another
class of liabilities under a bill of lading. Judge Curtis, in the
.anfacturing Co. vs. the bark Tangier, above referred to, decided
in conformity with forewood vs. .Pollock and Gatliff vs. Bourne,
that goods burned upon a wharf were not within the act of Congress.
The whole current of decisions in the English courts tends to
show that the maritime business has always been regulated as
entirely distinct from any other, and that the immense traffic in the
narrow seas has not been allowed to be withdrawn from its proper
character as seagoing commerce. So far as the term "inland1 navigation" is concerned in the English acts, no serious difficulty could
arise upon it. Every harbor in England is within the body of a
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county, while all waters outside of harbors are part of the high seas,
and under the jurisdiction of the admiralty. Lighters, barges and
canal boats, are all inland craft within all the definitions. The
writers on English commerce all treat of inland navigation as carried
on by small or light boats, and confined to rivers, canals and streams
strictly land guarded; and the decisions have invariably coupled
together the class of vessels and their proper employment, with the
language of the acts of Parliament applicable to them. The coasting
trade is defined by statute to be a trade by sea, and embraces now,
as we have seen, much business that, before the new law, was
actually foreign in legal contemplation. In the United States it is
equally regarded as an external sea-going trade, and this not only
by acts of Congress, but by courts; and is classed separately from
all internal commerce. See 2 Kent's Com. 599, 600; 10 J. R. 10,
11; Hastings vs. Pepper, 11 Pick. 41. See also, upon this subject,
Webster's Dic. "Navigation-Inland Navigation." Rees Cyc.
And also "Lighter,"
"Inland Navigation," "Barge," "Craft."
"Barge," in any marine dictionary.
The legal and popular sense of the term "inland," when applied
to navigation and commerce, differs somewhat from the geographical
term as applied to bodies of water. Geographers have classed nearly
all large bodies of water, except the great oceans, as "inland seas."
The Mediterranean, the North Sea, the Gulf of Mexico and the Baltic
are all included, geographically, within this class. Murray's Enc.
of Geog. p. 188. The Baltic has been, in our day, claimed as mare
clausum under the Danish authorities, and most nations have
acquiesced in their claim of toll for entering it; yet no one would
regard its navigation as in any sense inland navigation. The Mediterranean, and even the Adriatic, although geographically inland,
are not so commercially. And the old English claim that all the
narrow seas were close seas, and subject to British supremacy, never
removed them from admiralty jurisdiction, or regarded commerce
on them as inland commerce. The high seas commenced at low
water mark,, or at the mouths of estuaries and harbors, and nothing
was inland that was beyond those lines.
It is very obvious that, inasmuch as all harbors (except, perhaps,
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open roads,) are inland, the test of character could not be whether
a vesssel merely entered inland waters in the course of its business,
but must be found in its general use.-The object of the law being
to build up general maritime commerce, we have to look to that for
a criterion. The vessels not embraced by the terms of the act are
all of a class, peculiarly adapted to inland carriage. They are boats
of burden, unsuited to the open waters. Yet it might well happen
that larger vessels may be employed at times in strictly inland commerce, and if so, they would undoubtedly be held by their trade.
A general rule is necessary, and that rule is easily and simply
applied to the ordinary occupation. A vessel running from New
York to Boston is a sea-going vessel, although both her termini are
inland. A harbor lighter is not a sea-going vessel, although she
may, at times, be outside of the harbor. The English courts have
found no difficulty in making such applications of the law. Under
their pilot acts, the questions are of frequent occurrence. The case
of the Agricola, already referred to, and also the case of Bunter
vs. McGowan, are of this character. In Regina vs. Tibble, 80
Eng. L. & Eq. 872, the question whether a vessel came within the
Thames River acts, was made to depend upon her actual and habitual employment, although the term "western barge" sought to be
applied to her, did apply in its popular sense, but not, as the court
held, in its legal meaning. And in the United States District
Court for this district, the act of Congress exempting ferry boats
from the requirements applied to general passenger steamers, was
construed to exempt boats built and generally used as ferry boats,
although temporarily employed on a short trip off from the ferry
route, but in business quite similar to ferriage. It was held the law
could not have been intended to require of boats upon short routes,
where passengers were on board but a brief time, and needed no
extensive accommodations, the same rules which governed steamers,
which went on longer trips, and where there was need of conveniences
and safeguards. U. S. vs. the Ottawa, 1 Newberry's Adm. R. 536.
A similar rule was applied to such boats in reference to the registry
and enrolling acts by the United States Court in Missouri. United
States vs. The steamboat Jame8 Morrison, 1 Newberry's Adm. R.
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241. United States vs. steam Ferry Boat William Pope, Id, 256.
There can never be any practical difficulty in determining whether
a boat is employed in inland navigation, when the character of that
navigation has been determined.
In Wallis vs. Chesney, 4 Am. Law Reg. 307.-The District
Court of Maryland declined jurisdiction of a contract to carry coal
on a canal boat, as not a maritime contract, because a large portion
of the route was inland on a canal, although forty miles of carriage
was on tide water. And other cases will be referred to, under another
branch of the inquiry.
When an act is passed by Congress, modelled upon acts of Parliament, and containing similar qualifications, the rules which apply
to one should have some, if not a controlling force, in construing
the other. We have referred to the English Statutes from which
this law was taken, and we now propose to refer to the commercial
legislation and policy of this country to aid us in determining the
legal intendment of our statute. These are safer guides than any
individual opinion.
The commerce of the lakes has been regulated by acts of Congress,
from the outset of our history. Prior to 1831, navigation upon
them was regulated by the laws applicable on the seaboard; vessels
being registered for the foreign and enrolled and licensed for the
coasting trade. In 1831, as the necessities of commerce had
increased, provision was made for special enrolments, which would
permit vessels to be engaged in either coasting or foreign trade, and
no registry was required.-This in no wise altered the navigation
laws, otherwise than to favor lake navigation by opening the foreign
trade to enrolled vessels. U. S. vs. The Margaret rates, 22 Vt.
R. 665. In 1845, Congress by statute extended the jurisdiction of
admiralty over the lakes and their connecting waters-a jurisdiction intimated by the United States Supreme Court, to have existed
without legislation, on account of the character of these waters.
Fitzhugh vs. the Genesee Chief, 12 How. 443.-The registry law
passed in 1850 by Congress, (9 St. 440,) requiring transfers of
United States vessels to be recorded in the Custom Houses, not only
applied to lake vessels, but has been held by this court to exclude
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State legislation on the subject. Bobinson vs. Rice, 3 Mich. 285.
-The steamboat inspection law of 1838, for preventing accidents
on the water, was made in express terms to require of lake steamers
on the great lakes the same safeguards prescribed on the ocean, 5
St. 305. It is well known that the enactment of this law was procured on account of fatal accidents on Lake Erie. The steamboat
law of 1852 is in terms a mere amendment of the law of 1838. The
passenger steamers on the lakes are by that law left on the same
footing with ocean steamers, while ferry boats, tug and tow lioats,
and steamboats, under 150 tons, employed on canals, were exempted
entirely from the operation of the statute, and river steamboats of
all sizes were partially exempted, being required to have but one
life boat. 10 St. 62.
In 1851, when the act to limit the responsibility of ship owners
-was passed, the lake commerce had been placed by the prior legislation upon the same footing with that of the ocean. It had been
recognized as subject to the same dangers and partaking of the same
character. The loss of the Lexington by fire, on Long Island
Sound, and the decision of the Supreme Court on the liability of her
owners, in 6 How. R. 344, were the immediate occasion of its passage. The peculiar interior position of the Sound had, as early as
1795, caused a special enactment to be passed exempting vessels
crossing from Long Island to Rhode Island from the rules applying
to vessels trading between districts not adjoining-a provision similar to that which, in 1831, relieved lake commerce from like difficulties. We might well suppose that a law drawn up under such
circumstances to exonerate ship owners would not stop short of providing for all cases of the same character. After the broad legislation regulating our lake trade, and considering its true character,
which had certainly become somewhat prominent, we cannot be
warranted in holding that a statute applying or meant to apply to
the protected waters of the Sound, is inapplicable to the more exposed
navigation of the lakes, on the ground that such navigation is inland,
unless such a meaning is very clearly to be derived from the terms
of the act of Congress. Let us, therefore, see whether there is any
other, and if so, what inland navigation to which the language is
applicable.
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It is very clear that where commerce is confined exclusively to
the territory of a single State, Congress has no control over it.
Gibbons vs. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1; Milner vs. N. J. R. B. Co., 6 Am.
Law Reg. Nov., 1857. The great canals of New York, Ohio,
Indiana, Illinois, and Pennsylvania, and much interior river navigation, come under the head of local and domestic commerce, and
may well have been intended in this exception. The business referred to by the District Court of Missouri in the cases cited, is of the
same kind. But we have also several large rivers which are not
internal as far as single States are concerned, and yet are inland
in the sense of being entirely sheltered by land within the Republic,
and capable of being navigated in safety by any description of boats
or small craft. We have many large and important harbors where
hundreds of lighters, tugs, barges, and steamers of various sizes are
plying constantly in a purely inland service, but subservient to
foreign trade, or that between States. We have also in several
places canals entirely within single States, which are used to facilitate
the passage of rivers which pass through different States, to avoid
rapids and furnish means of continuous navigation. Some of these
rivers are on the borders of States, and divide them. Others are
within single States, but are used in commerce between different
States. The Ohio and the Mississippi are boundary streams; the
Missouri traverses one State and bounds others; the Delaware, the
Susquehanna, the Potomac, the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers,
and several others, occupy similar positions, while most of the Hudson and the whole of James river, and several other streams, such
as the Sacramento and many more, are within single States, and
yet open to commerce from tide water. Upon all of these streams
there is important commerce within the control of Congress, and laws
have been made expressly with reference to it. Canal boats have
been directly exempted from marine hospital taxes, and from the
ordinary fees for registry, enrolment and license; and they cannot
be libelled for wages. This is the case, even when their terminus
and a considerable portion of their passage, are in tide waters.Buckley vs. Brown, Brightly's Dig. U. S. Laws, 305. Their crews
are not entitled to marine hospital relief, D. The reason of this is
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very obvious, for although within congressional jurisdiction, their
employment is not maritime. Boats and lighters without masts, or
if masted, not decked, employed in the harbor of any town or city,
are entirely exempted from the enrolment and license acts. 1 St.
817, 318. It has been held that coal barges on the Monongahela
river are not within admiralty jurisdiction. Jones vs. Cincinnati
Coal Co., 3 Am. Law Reg. 391. The steamboat inspection act does
not, as has been stated, apply to tugs, or towing boats, ferry boats,
or canal steamers, and requires but a single life-boat, on the largest
river steamers. And the act of Congress of 1845, which extended
admiralty jurisdiction over the lakes, and straits between them, did
not undertake to do so over even our largest rivers. And whether
courts have done so or not, the course of legislation has certainly
distinguished the.-And the decision in the case of the renesee
Chief does not, in fact, settle any question of jurisdiction on any
waters but the lakes. In Jones vs. The Cincinnati Coal Co., before
cited, judge Grier denies the applicability of the doctrine to any
but enrolled and licensed vessels anywhere, and in referring to that
case, intimates very plainly that it was not intended to reach river
navigation.
When, therefore, after providing that the owners of any ship or
vessel shall be free from liability on account of fire on board, not
occasioned by their design or neglect, the statute provides that "this
act shall not apply to the owners of any canal boat, barge, or lighter, or to any vessel of any description whatsoever, used in rivers
or inland navigation," we may properly look to the existing legislation on such navigation, to determine the effect of the act. And
when we find all the vessels named have been exempted from many
of the duties and burdens common to other navigation, and when
especially we find such of them as are propelled by steam, exempted
-wholly or partially, from the provisions devised to guard against
fire, there is good reason for excluding them from some of the privileges extended by Congress to other vessels. And there is in the
character of the navigation itself, much to distinguish it fron lake
or ocean service. There is no danger of foreign competition in such
trade, unless in a very few frontier places, and not much there. The
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risks to vessels, with the one exception of fire, are lighter, and when
danger occurs it is with less hazard of entire destruction of the
cargo. Danger from storms or wrecks on these sheltered waters is
comparatively trifling. The danger from fire is greater from the
light construction of the boats, and the mode of stowage, upon
rivers than upon open waters. The opportunities for theft and
embezzlement are infinitely greater where a safe landing can be
made anywhere, and where stoppages occur every few hours, if not
every few miles.-Upon the lakes cargoes are more securely stowed,
and are not so easily shifted or robbed. And while the characters
and risks of the various kinds of business differ so materially, there
is another respect in which lake navigation greatly subserves our
national policy. The merchant marine has been fostered in Great
Britain and America, not only for commercial, but also for naval
purposes. The mariners receive a training which enables the nation
to man its navy in war with competent seamen. In this country,
with a small navy, our merchant vessels as well as seamen, form
important elements of strength. Not only on the ocean but also on
the lakes, the same ships have been used effectively for the double
purposes of war and peace. Our lake trade employs great numbers
of able mariners, fitted for service in any ships or on any waters.
Our river trade is mostly served by landsmen, or boatmen who would
rate as such on shipboard. Not only therefore have we a large
navigation, either inland, or of an inland character, which is subject
to Congressional regulation, and which may easily satisfy the terms
of the act, but it differs in most, if not in all respects, as much from
lake, as it does from ocean business, both in its public and in its
private character and policy.
But lake navigation is not inland navigation in any sense. The
lakes are not within the borders of any State, and, except Lake
Michigan, are not within the United States. But their border character alone would not serve to make them maritime, or change the
scale of their commerce. It is their intrinsic nature and not their
position alone which characterizes their commerce, but their position
is also important in some views of national jurisdiction. Our courts
have long since learned to disregard the exploded notion, that there
is any radical difference between salt and fresh water commerce.
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The old rule of the English Admiralty and its reasons are clearly
stated in the sea laws, in a treatise which is appended to 2 Peters'
"In aqua dulei a ship may become a deodand;
Adm. Reports:
but in the sea or in aqua salsa, being an arm of the sea, though it
be in the body of the country, yet there can be no deodand of the
ship, or any part of it, though anybody be drowned out of it, or
otherwise come by their death in the ship, because on such waters
ships and other vessels are subject to such dangers upon the raging
waves, in respect of wind and tempest; and this diversity all our
ancient lawyers do agree in." p. lxxi. This reason is a sound one,
and does not depend upon the freshness of the water, but in England,
generally or universally, cexists with it. The perils which are
referred to are as characteristic of the lakes as of the ocean. And
in the Genesee Chief, case 12 How. R. 448, the Supreme Court,
referring to the act of Congress of 1845, extending the Admiralty
jurisdiction over the lakes, say (p. 458,) " If this law, therefore, is
constitutional, it must be supported on the ground that the lakes,
and navigable waters connected with them, are within the scope of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, as known and understood in
the United States when the constitution was adopted. If the meaning of these terms were now for the first time brought before this
court for consideration, there could, we think, be no hesitation in
saying that the lakes and their connecting waters were embraced in
them. These lakes are, in truth, inland seas. Different States
border on them on one side, and a foreign nation on the other.
A great and growing commerce is carried on upon them between
different States and a foreign nation, which is subject to all the incidents and hazards that attend commerce on the ocean. Hostile
fleets have encountered on them, and prizes been made ; and every
reason which existed for the grant of admiralty jurisdiction to the
general goverment on the Atlantic seas, applies with equal force to
the lakes." And the court very forcibly repudiates the supposed
distinction between fresh and salt waters.
The true distinction between inland navigation and any other, as
we think, must be found in its character as confined to narrow or
land guarded internal waters, contradistinguished from that which is
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maritime in its nature. This is the only distinction which can be
drawn from the English practice; it is the only one which distinguishes the real character of the various trades, and it is the only
one that has any real foundation in the risks and exigencies of commerce. Judge Grier, in the case of Jones vs. Cincinnati Coal Co.,
above cited, uses this language, referring to coal barges-that case
arising out of a collision between such vessels-"A remedy in rem
against such a vessel, either for its contracts or its torts, would not
only be worthless but ridiculous, and the application of the maritime law to the cargo and hands employed to navigate her, would
be equally so." " If it was unreasonable to refuse to ships and
steamboats on our great lakes and rivers the benefit of the remedies
afforded by courts of admiralty, it may be equally so to apply the.
principles and practice of the maritime law to everything that floats
on a fresh water stream. Every mode of remedy and doctrine of the
maritime law affecting ships and mariners, may be justly applied to
ships and steamboats, but could have no application whatever to
rafts and flat-boats."
If that is inland navigation which is carried on upon inland
waters in the geographical sense, we shall be led to strange results.
These lakes are classed by geographers, as well as courts and
mariners, as inland seas, and are not lakes at all, in the proper
geographical sense, because they have a direct outlet to the ocean.
1 Murray's Encyc. of Geog., 188, 201; 8 ibd. 350. Inland seas
embrace, according to the classification, the Baltic, North and ):,editerranean seas, the Gulfs of Mexico and St. Lawrence, Hudson's
Bay, and all other bodies of water separated from the open ocean,
and yet opening into it. The Baltic, indeed, except during the prevalence of west winds is comparatively fresh, and all its saltness is
derived by influx from the ocean. The same remark is applicable
with still greater force to the Black Sea. The outlets to both are
narrow, and controlled by single powers. But the inland waters of
Europe are the seat of an extended commerce, and the ocean is buat
the passage way to reach it. The ports which, geographically, are
on inland waters, control the commerce of the world. The Atlantic ports of Europe are comparatively insignificant beside them.
3
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And not only is this so, but the whole admiralty law was formed
and settled in those waters. The Rhodian law, the tables of Amalfi and the Consolato del Mare were the offspring and the guide
of Mediterranean commerce, while the laws of Wisbuy and of the
Hanse towns were devised for the Baltic. The principles thus
adopted, suggested by the early exigencies of a commerce in those
inland waters, which was almost insignificant compared with the
lake trade, have stood the test of time throughout the whole civilized
world, and every admiralty code is founded upon them. A construction which would make lake navigation inland navigation, simply
because the lakes are classed by geographers as inland waters, would
apply with equal force to those European waters which were the very
-cradle of maritime power. And to do so and yet leave the navigation
of Long Island Sound out of such a classification, would be to ignore every principle of commercial usage.
Not only has the lake commerce been put upon a maritime footing by the navigation laws, and by the decisions of courts, but it, in
point of fact, is in all respects as much so as that of the Baltic and
lvlediterranean. The vessels used in its ordinary navigation are not
only capable of employment, but are actually employed in transatlantic voyages, while some, at least, of the lake fleet were brought
over originally from Europe. For more than thirty years our gov-ernment has been striving to secure the free navigation of the St.
Lawrence for the purpose of enabling lake vessels to communicate
with the ocean free from the restrictions imposed on them by the
British laws. This privilege was claimed as a matter of right by the
-executive department in 1826, and was placed upon the ground that
the right to navigate the lakes and the ocean gave a corresponding
claim to navigate their connecting waters. Mr. Clay, then Secretary
of State, insisted that if the St. Lawrence were regarded as a
strait," connecting navigable seas, as it ought properly to be, there
vould be less controversy. And he proceeds thus: " The princi-ple on which the right to navigate straits depends, is, that they are
accessorial to those seas which they unite, and the right of navigating which is not exclusive, but common to all nations; the right to
navigate the seas, drawing after it that of passing the straits. The

MURRAY'S ASSIGNEE vs. ASSIGNEE OF DEVER & MURRAY.

35

United States and Great Britain have between them the exclusive
right of navigating the lakes. The St. Lawrence connects them
with the ocean.' The right to navigate both (the lakes and the
ocean) includes that of passing from one to the other; through the
natural link." .Correspondence of 1826, 33 Niles' Register, 411
et seq.
Mr. Wheaton has expressed similar views on the right to navigate
straits, (Wheat. Int. Law, 240, 250,) and applied them to the question of the Danish Sound dues-concerning the right to which our
government took the same ground which had been asserted on the
St. Lawrence. Both questions are now set at rest by treaty, and
our vessels have the right of passage to the ocean unmolested. 10
St. U. S. 1091. (Reciprocity Treaty.)
The lake commerce being in fact maritime in its nature, and
having been thus recognized as such by all the departments of the
federal goverment, and regulated as such by congress, we cannot
hesitate so to consider it in construing the act in question. And
being satisfied that the inland navigation mentioned in the act cannot properly comprehend the maritime commerce of the lakes, we
are of the opinion that the plaintiff in error is not liable for the property destroyed by fire on the propeller Spaulding, such fire not
having been caused by design or negligence; and that the court
below erred in charging the jury that the navigation of the lakes
was inland navigation within the meaning of the act of Congress.

In the Supreme Court of Ohio.
ANDREW D. ROGERS, ASSIGNEE OF PETER MURRAY VS. JOHN IIERAUDA,
ASSIGNEE OF DEVER AND MURRAY ET AL.
1. It is a rule of equity in the distribution of thejoint and sepvarateassets of insolvent partners, that the individual assets of a partner be first applied to the debts
of his individual creditors, and the partnership assets first to the partnership
debts-the preference of the separate creditors in the individual property resulting as a necessary correlative from the priority of the joint creditors, in the joint
effects inseparable from the nature of the relation of the partners to each other.

86

MURRAY'S ASSIGNEE vs. ASSIGNEE OF DEVER & MURRAY.

2. This rule does not apply when there is no joint estate for distribution, and no living
solvent partner.
3. But where there are both joint and separate effects for distribution, the joint
creditors can, in equity, only look to the surplus of the separate estate of a partner, after the payment of his individual debts:
4. And the individcal creditors can, in like manner, only seek distribution from
the partnership effects, out of the surplus of the joint fend after payment of the
partnership debts.
5. The individual creditors of a partner are not entitled to an equal distribution
with the partnership creditors out of the joint effects, on account of an indebtedness
of the firm to such partner for money loaned by him to the firm, unless the money
loaned was obtained by the firm fraudulently, or advanced by the partner with
an improper design to augment the joint estate by a reducton of the separate
estate.

This is a petition in error to reverse the judgment of the Common
Pleas of Clark County. The original proceeding was a petition for
an order of distribution of the separate or individual assets of an
insolvent partner as between separate and partnership creditors.
It appears from the record that about the 13th, of June 1854,
Peter Murray, an insolvent debtor, made an assignment of all his
estate, real and personal, to the plaintiff, in trust for the payment
of his individual creditors, in proportion to the amount of their
respective demands. Though possessed of a large and valuable
estate, it had been found insufficient to pay his separate debts and
liabilities in full. At the date of his failure and assignment, he was
a partner with John W. Dever, in a mercantile firm, under the name
and style of Dever and Murray; which firm had also become insolvent, and likewise Dever; and the firm had made an assignment of
the partnership property and assets, about the same time, to John
Merauda, one of the defendants, in trust for the payment of the joint
debts or liabilities of the firm.
In this condition of affairs, the partnership creditors, although
they have filed their claims with the assignee of the firm for their
distributive shares out of the partnership property, claim the right
to be admitted to a participation in the dividends of the separate
estate of Murray pari passu with his individual creditors; while
the latter deny the right, and insist that his separate estate shall be
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applied to the satisfaction of his individual debts in preference to his
partnership debts.
It appears further, that Murray, besides advancing his part of the
capital of the firm, also loaned money to the firm, to a large amount,
for which he held the obligations of the firm, which obligations, by
the assignment of Murray, came to the hands of the plaintiff, who
has presented the same to the assignee of the firm, and claims to
have the same paid out of the assets of the firm pari passu with
the partnership debts. That the other creditors resist this, and he
asks an order of distribution to that effect out of the partnership assets.
The defendants demurred to the petition. The court below sustained the demurrer, and gave judgment in favor of the defendants.
And the petition in error is filed to review and reverse this proceeding.
S. &f.R. Mason, attorneys for the plaintiff.
Conover &' Craighead,and Anthony & Goode, atty's for def't.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BARTLEY, C. J.-Two questions are presented for determination
in this case. The first is, whether, in the distribution of the assets
of insolvent partners, where there are both individual and partnership assets, the individual creditors of a partner are entitled to be
first paid out of the individual effects of their debtor, before the
partnership creditors are entitled to any distribution therefrom. It
is well settled that, in the distribution of assets of insolvent partners
the partnership creditors are entitled to a priority in the partnership
effects; so that the partnership debts must be settled, before any
division of the partnership funds can be made among the individual
creditors of the several partners. This is incident to the nature of
partnership property. It is the right of every partner to have the
partnership property applied to the purposes of the firm; and the
separate.interest of each partner in the partnership property, is his
share of the surplus after the payment of the partnership debts.
And this rule, which gives the partnership creditors a preference in
the partnership effects, would seem to produce in equity a corresponding and correlative rule, giving a preference to the individual credi-
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tors of a partner in his separate property; so that partnership creditors, can, in equity, only look to the surplus of the separate property
of a partner, after the payment of his individual debts; and on the
other hand, the individual creditors of a partner can in like manner,
only claim distribution from the debtors interest in the surplus of
the joint fund, after the satisfaction of the partnership creditors.
The correctness of this rule, however, has been much controverted;
and there has not been always a perfect coincidence in the reasons
assigned for it by those courts which have adhered to it. By some,
it has been said to be an arbitrary rule established from considerations of convenience; by others, that it rests on the basis, that a
primary liability attaches to the fund on which the credit was given
that in the contracts with a partnership, credit is given on the supposed responsibility of the firm; while in contracts with a partner as
an individual, reliance is supposed to be placed on his separate
responsibility. 3 Kent Com. 65. And again, others have assigned
as a reason for the rule, that the joint estate is supposed to be benefited to the extent of every credit which is given to the firm, and
that the separate estate is, in like manner, presumed to be enlarged
by the debts contracted by the individual partner; and that there is
consequently a clear equity in confining the creditors, as to prefer-:
ences to each estate respectively, which has been thus benefited by
their transactions. I Har. & Gill's R. 96. But these reasons are
not entirely satisfactory. So important a rule must have a better
foundation to stand upon, than mere considerations of convenience,
and practically it is undeniable, that those who give credit to a
partnership, look to the individual responsibility of the partners, as
well as that of the firm; and also those who contract with a partner
in his separate capacity place reliance on his various resources or
means, whether individual or joint. And inasmuch as individual
debts are often contracted to raise means which are put into the
business of a partnership, and also partnership effects are often withdrawn from the firm and appropriated to the separate use of the
partners, it cannot be practically true, that the separate estate has
been benefited to the extent of every credit given to each individual
partner, nor that the joint estate has retained from the separate
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estate of each partner, the benefit of every credit given to the firm.
Unsatisfactory reasons may weaken confidence in a rule which is
well founded.
What then is the true foundation of the rule, which gives the
individual creditor a preference over the partnership creditor in the
distribution of the separate estate of a partner? To say that is a
rule of general equity, as has been sometimes said, is not a satisfactory solution of the difficulty; for the very question is, whether it
be a rule of equity or not. In the distribution of the assets of
insolvents, equality is equity; and to say, that the rule which gives
the individual creditor a preference over the partnership creditor in
the separate estate of a partner is a rule of equality, does not still
rid the subject of difficulty. :For leavirg the rule to stand, which
gives the preference to the joint creditors in the partnership property, perfect equality between the joint and individual creditors is
perhaps rarely attainable. That it is, however, more equal and
just, as a general rule, than any other which can be devised, consistently with the preference to the partnership creditors in the joint
estate, cannot be successfully controverted. It originated as a consequence of the rule of priority of partnership creditors in the joint
estate; and for the purposes of justice, became necessary as a correlative rule. With what semblance of equity could one class of
creditors in preference to the rest be exclusively entitled to the
partnership fund, and concurrently with the rest entitled to a distributive share out of the separate estate of each partner? The
joint creditors are no more meritorious than the separate creditors ;
and'it frequently happens that the separate debts are contracted to
raise means to carry on the partnership business. Independent of
this rule, the joint creditors have as a general thing a great advantage over the separate creditors. Besides being exclusively entitled
to the partnership fund, they take their distributive share in the
surplus of the separate estate of each of the several partners, after
the payment of the separate creditors of each. It is a rule of equity,
that where one creditor is in a situation to have two or more distinct
securities or funds to rely on, the court will not allow him, neglecting his other funds, to attach himself to one of the funds to the
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prejudice of those who have a claim upon that, and no other to
depend on. And besides the advantage which the joint creditors
have arising, from the fact that the partnership fund is usually much
the larger, inasmuch as men in trade in a great majority of cases,
embark their all, or the chief part of their property in it,-and besides
their distributive rights in the surplus of the separate estate of the
other partner, the joint creditors have a degree of security for their
debts, and facilities for recovering them, which the separate creditors
have not; they can sell both joint and separate estate on an execution, while the separate creditor can sell only the separate property,
and the interest in the joint effects that may remain to the partner
after the account of the debts and effects of the firm are taken, as
between the firm and its creditors, and also as between the partners
themselves. With all these advantages in favor of partnership
creditors, it would be grossly inequitable to allow them the exclusive
benefit of the joint fund, and then a concurrentright with individual
creditors to an equal distribution in the separate estate of each
partner. What equality and justice is there in allowing partnership
creditors who have been paid eighty per cent on their debts out of
the joint fund, to come in pari passu with the individual creditors
of one of the partners, whose separate property will not pay twenty
per cent. to his separate creditors ? How could that be said to be
an equal distribution of the assets of insolvents among creditors ?
It is true, that an occasional case may arise where the joint effects
are proportionably less than the separate assets of an insolvent
partner. But as a general thing, a very decided advantage is given
to the partnership creditors, notwithstanding this preference of individual creditors in the separate property. And that advantage
arising out of the nature of a partnership contract, is unavoidable
Some general rule is necessary; and that must rest on the basis of
the unalterable preference of the partnership creditors in the joint
effects, and their further right to some claim in the separate property
of each of the several partners. The preference therefore, of the
individual creditors of a partner in the distribution of his separate
estate, results as a principle of equity from the preference of partnership creditors in the partnership funds, and their advantage in
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having different funds to resort to, while the individual creditors
have but the one.
It has been argued, that partnership contracts are several as well
as joint, and consequently, have an equal legal right with separate
creditors upon the individual property of a partner. But the right
of partnership creditors against the separate property of individual
partners in proceedings at law is not in controversy. The question
here relates to the relative equitable rigits of two classes of creditors
in the distribution of the estates of insolvents. Much of the confusion upon this subject has arisen from confounding the abstract rights
of creditors in proceedings at law, with their relative rights to an
equitable adjustment in marshaling the assets of insolvents in
chancery. The rule here adopted appears to have been followed in
England for near a century and a half. We find it distinctly
recognized in the case of .Exparte Crowder 2 Fernon 706, decided
in 1715. And in Ex parte Cook, 2 Peere Williams, 500. Lord
Chancellor King declared it settled as a rule of convenience in
bankruptcy, that joint creditors should be first paid out of the
partnership estate, and the separate creditors out of the separate
estate of each partner; and if there be a surplus of the joint estate
after paying the joint creditors, the share of each partner should be
distributed to his separate creditors; and if on the other hand there
should be a surplus. of the separate estate of a partner after the
satisfaction of his individual creditors, it should be applied to any
deficiency of the joint funds in satisfaction of the partnership debts.
Lord Hardwicke followed the same rule il -x parte .Eunter,1
Atkins 228. But it appears, that in -Ex parte Hfodgson, decided
in 1785, 2 Bro. Ch., Lord Thurlow made an innovation on the rule
in bankruptcy, declaring that there was no distinction between
joint and separate creditors; that they ought to be paid out of the
bankrupt's estate and his moiety of the joint estate; and that the
joint creditors ought to come in paripassuwith the separate creditors. This ruling of Lord Thurlow, appears to have had reference
to proceedilngs at law and in bankruptcy, for it is said, that consistently therewith, it was competent for the assignees to confine the
joint creditors, where there was a joint estate, to that fund exclusively
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by filing a bill in equity against the other partners, and obtaining
an injunction on the order in bankruptcy. But how far this innovation went in practice to affect the ultimate rights of the parties,
is wholly immaterial, inasmuch as Lord Lougborough, in ex parte
Elton, 3 Yes. Jr. 238, in the year 1796, restored the rule which
previously prevailed, holding that the rule introduced by the case
of Hodgson was inconvenient, inasmuch as every order which he
passed in bankruptcy, giving a joint creditor a dividend out of the
separate estate of a partner would give rise to a bill in equity on
the part of the separate creditors, to restrain the order and secure
the application of the separate estate to the satisfaction of the separate
debts; and although it was adjudged that a joint creditor might prove
his claim under a separate commission, yet he could not receive any
dividend therefrom until the amount of his distribution in the joint
fund could be ascertained, and the claims of the separate creditors
satisfied. And the opinion of the Lord Chancellor, in this case, puts
an end to the assertion which has been sometimes made, that this
rule was peculiar to proceedings in bankruptcy. Touching this he
said: "If it stands as a rule of law, we must consider, what I have
always understood to be settled by a vast variety of cases, not only
in bankruptcy, but upon general equity, that the joint estate is
applicable to the partnership debts, and the separate estate to the
separate debts." Again, in speaking of the inconvenience of Lord
Thurlow's rule, he said: "What I o-der here to day, sitting in bankruptcy, I shall forbid to morrow, sitting in chancery; for it is quite
of course to stop the. dividend on a bill filed. The plain rule of
distributionis that each estate shall bear its own debts. Th7e equity
is so plain, that it is of course upon a bill filed."
Lord Eldon with some characteristic doubts and misgivings consistently followed this rule of his immediate predecessor. Chiswell
vs. G-ray, 9 Yes. 126 ; Dutton vs. Morrison, 17 Yes. 207. And it
has since remained the settled law of England, applicable not simply
to proceedings in bankruptcy, but as a general rule of equity in the
distribution of the assets of insolvents. The supposition t)aat this
rule arose from any provision of the statutes concerning bankruptcy
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in England is a mistake, it was long and well settled as a rule of
equity, before any statute was enacted touching this subject. It
does not appear to have been sanctioned by any positive enactment
until the statute of 6 Geo. 4, c. 16, s. 16.
It is not a little remarkable that this rule of equity, so long settled
and acted on in England, should have encountered so much opposition as it has in the courts of the several States in this country.
In Pennsylvania the rule was supposed to have been discarded
by a majority of the court, in the case of Bell vs. Newman, 5 Serg.
& R. 78, decided in 1819; and the rule adopted in that case was,
that where a surviving partner dies indebted to partnership and also
to individual creditors, and leaving joint assets, and also separate
assets, the separate creditors should receive as much out of the
separate property, as the joint creditors could receive from the
separate portion or share of such partner in the joint property; and
that then, the balance of the separate property should be divided
*pro rata among both classes of creditors. This was placed partly
on the ground of equity, and partly on the ground of a statute
directing equality of distribution of the assets of deceased persons.
Judge Gibson, however, dissented, insisting forcibly on the rule
adopted in England, as a general principle founded in equity. And
it has been insisted, that this case did not strictly fall within the
application of the principle, inasmuch as the estate to be distributed
in that case was the estate of a surviving partner, against which
the claims of the joint creditors were as purely legal as those of the
separate creditors. And Chief Justice Tilghman remarked, in the
opinion in that case, that "no rule was intended to be laid down
which may affect cases differently circumstanced." The case of
Sperry's .Estate, 1 Ashmead 347, dia not as it appears, directly affect
question, inasmuch as it came fully within the exception, that where
there is no joint fund, and no solvent partner, the separate and joint
creditors should be paid ratably out of the separate estate. The
question was again brought to the attention of the court in that
State, in Walker. vs. .yth, 25 Penn. St. R. 216, when the opinion
was expressed, that it is a rule of equity, "that where there are
partnership and separate creditors, each estate should be applied

44

M11URRAY'S ASSIGNEE vs. ASSIGNEE OF DEVER & MURRAY.

exclusively to the payment of its own creditors: the joint estate to
the joint creditors, and the separate estate to the separate creditors."
But the question was not directly decided, the decision of the case
being put upon another ground. So that the general principle in a
case proper for its application, is said to remain still an open question in Pennsylvania, 1 Amer. L. Cases, 483.
In Virginia the question was presented in 1848, in the case of
M"1orris's Adm'r vs. ii1orris's Adm'r, 4 Grattan R. 293, and was
elaborately discussed on both sides; but the court was equally divided
on the question of the adoption of the rule as a general rule of
equity, and the decision of the case was put on other grounds.
In New Jersey, in the case of Wisham vs. Lippincott, 1 Stockton's Ch. R. 353, the rule was doubted as a general principle of
equity, although the point was not decided.
In Vermont, in the case of Bardwell vs. Perry et al. 19 Verm.
R. 292, the rule was discarded as a principle of equity, with this
qualification, that the separate creditors could require in equity, that
the joint creditors should first exhaust the partnership funds before
coming in with the separate creditors of a partner for a pro rata
distribution out of his separate estate.
It does not appear that the doctrine of the English courts, on this
subject, was ever adopted as a rule of equity by the courts in Massachusetts ; but it is said, that a statute was enacted in that State, in
1848, providing as a rule for the distribution of insolvent's estates,
that the net proceeds of the separate estate shall go to the separate
creditors, and of the partnership estate to the joint creditors.
The rule appears to have been discarded in Connecticet, in the
case of Camp vs. Grant et al.21 Conn. R. 41; and also in Mississippi, in the case of -Dahgran"Adm'rvs. Duncan, 7 Sm. & Mars.
R. 280. But it was adopted in Alabama, in Bridge vs. M' Cullough,
27 Ala. R. 661.
In New York, it has been adjudged, that the rule of equity was
uniform and stringent; that the partnership property of a firm shall
all be applied to the partnership debts to the exclusion, of the
creditors of the individual members of the firm; and that the creditors of the latter are to be first paid out of the separate effects of
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their debtor before the partnership creditors can claim anything
therefrom." Jacksonvs. Cornell, 1 Sandf. Oh. R. 848. The history
of the English rule was somewhat revived by Chancellor Kent, in
21furray vs. Murray, 5 Johns. Ch. R., 60; and upon full consideration
adopted as a rule of equity, by Chancellor Walworth, in Wilder vs.
Keeler, 3 Paige R. 517 ; Paynevs. Matthews, 6 Paige 19; Hutchinson vs. Smith, 7 Ibid 26.
The same doctrine-was adopted by Chancellor Dessaussure, in South
Carolina, as early as 1811, in Woddrop vs. Ward, 8 Dess. Eq. R.
203; and also, by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, in Jarvis
vs. Brooks, 3 Foster 186.
The subject was very fully reviewed in the Court of Appeals of
Maryland, in Mc6ulloh vs. Dashiell'sAdm'r, 1 Har. & Gill, 96;
wherein it was settled in that State, that in equity the individual
creditors of a partner were entitled to a preference over the joint
creditors in the distribution of the separate estate of their debtor.
And the same doctrine was settled by the Supreme Court of the
United States, on full consideration, in .1urrill et al. vs. Neil et al.
8 How. 414. And it has been laid down generally by the elementary
writers both in England and in this eountry, as a settled rule
of equity. Story in his work on Partnership ch. 15, secs. 365 &
366, says:
"This principle of equity jurisprudence, that the joint creditors shall be entitled
to a priority of payment out of the joint effects, and the separate creditors to a like
priority out of the separate effects before the other class of creditors shall be entitled
to any portion of the surplus is not, perhaps, under all its aspects, so purely artificial as it has sometimes been suggested to be; at least it has been often relied upon
as the dictate of naturaljustice."

It is true, the same author, in sec. 877, of the same work, qualifies
this opinion as follows:
"sThis rule, although now firmly established, stands as much, if not more, upon
the general ground of authority and the maxim stare decisIs, than upon the ground
of any equitable reasoning;" and further that "after the repeated doubts which
have been expressed upon the subject by the most eminent judges, it is not perhaps
too much to say that it rests on a foundation as questionable and as unsatisfactory
as any rule in the whole system of our jurisprudence."
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And he adds:
"Such as it is however, it is for the public repose that it should be left undisturbed, as it may not be easy to substituteany other rule,which would uniformly work with
perfect equality and equity in the mass of intricate transactions connected with commercial operations."

Kent, in his Commentaries, 8 vol. p. 65, says:
"The joint creditors have the primary claim upon the joint fund in the distribution of assets of bankrupts or insolvent partners, and the partnership debts are to
be settled before any division of the funds takes place. So far as the partnership
property has been acquired by means of partnership debts, those debts have in
equity, a priority of claim to be discharged; and the separate creditors are only
entitled in equity to seek payment from the surplus of the joint fund after satisfaction of the joint debts. The equity of the rule on the other hand, equally requires that
the Joint creditors should only look to the surplus of the separateestates of the partners,
afterpayment of the separate debts. It was a principle of the Roman law and it has
been acknowledged in the equity jurisprudence of Spain, England, and the United
States, that partnership debts must be paid out of the partnership estate, and
private and separate debts out of the private and separate estate of the individual
partner. If the partnership creditors cannot obtain payment out of the partnership
estate, they cannot in equity resort to the private and separate estate, until private
and separate creditors are satisfied; nor have the creditors of the individual partners
any claim upon the partnership property, until all the partnership creditors are
satisfied."

It is argued, however, that this doctrine was overruled, in Ohio,
in the case of Grosvenor vs. Austin, 6 Oh. R. 104. It is true that
the reasoning of the court in the opinion in that case is to that effect;
but the case decided falls within one of the acknowledged exceptions
to the rule. Where the partnership has become insolvent, and there
are no partnership assets for distribution, and no living solvent
partner, it has been uniformly conceded, that the principle of the
rule does not apply. The case of Grosvenor vs. Austin, was a bill
in equity by the creditors of the firm of Seymour Austin, and Calvin Austin for a distributive share with the individual creditors of
Seymour Austin out of the assets of his separate estate in the hands
of his administrator. There were no partnership assets, and both
partners had died insolvent. This was not a case, therefore, for the
application of the principld under consideration; and Judge Lane,
in delivering the opinion of the court, said, touching this rule-" This
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court are of opinion, that if any such rule exists it must have been
of frequent application, and thus have become familiar to the profession. Yet no case is found in the books, except the one in 9 Vesey,
and the South Carolina case, that touches such a doctrine, unless
cases founded on the statutes of bankruptcy. A claim so novel
in a case necessarily of such common occurrence, must be listened
to with caution amounting to jealousy," &c.
Touching the subject of this obiter opinion, the following remarks
of the Supreme Court of the United States, in Aburrill vs. _Areill,
are in point: "The rule in equity governing the administration
of insolvent partnership is one of familiar acceptation and practice;
it is one which will be found to have been in practice in this country
from the beginning of our judicial history, and to have been generally,
if not universally, received. This rule, with one or two eccentric
variations in the English practice which may be noted hereafter, is
believed to be identical with that prevailing in England, and is this:
that partnership creditors shall, in the first instance, be satisfied
from the partnership estate; and separate or private creditors of the
individual partners from the separate and private estate of the
partners with whom they have made private and individual contracts,
and that the private and individual property of the partners shall
not be applied in extinguishment of partnership debts, until the
separate and individual creditors of the respective partners shall be
paid. The reason and foundation of this rule, or its equality and
fairness the court is not called on to justify. Were these less obvious
than they are, it were enough to show the early adoption andgeneral
prevalence of this rule to stay the hand of innovation, at this day,
at least, under anymotive less strong than the most urgent propriety."
It has been urged, that the statute of this State relative to the
equal distribution of the estates of deceased persons, and also the
statute providing that all assignments of property in contemplation
of insolvency, giving preference to creditors, had established in this
State a policy inconsistent with the rule in question. These statutes
were certainly never intended to have such an effect. The equality
required by them is subordinate to the settled equities and priorities
of different grades and classes of creditors. It was manifestly not
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the design of these statutes to change the nature of partnership
contracts, and abrogate the preference of partnership creditors in

the distribution of the partnership assets. And as this was not done,
the rule of equality adopted in equity requires the corresponding
preference to be given to the individual creditors of each partner in
his separate estate.
The remaining matter for determination, in this case, involves
the inquiry, whether in case of an indebtedness for money lent to the
partnership by a partner, who afterwards becomes insolvent, the
separate creditors of the latter shall be entitled therefore to a pro
rata distribution with the partnership creditors out of the joint fund.
It is claimed, that the liability of the firm to a partner for money
loaned is a partnership debt, and that the individual creditors of
that partner are in equity entitled to an equal distribution therefor
out of the partnership property. On the other hand, it is claimed,
that as each partner is individually liable for the debts of the firm,
and as no partner can be allowed to participate with his own creditors in the distribution of a fund, the separate creditors of a partner,
as they can only claim through the rights of their debtor, cannot be
allowed such participation with the joint creditors.
It was at one time held to be the law on the authority of adjudications by Lord Talbot, and Lord Hardwicke, that if a partner has
loaned money to the partnership, or the partnership has loaned
money to the separate estate of one of the partners, according to the
equitable rule for the distribution of assets after insolvency, in the
former case, the separate creditors of the partner would be entitled to an
equal share out of the joint assets to the extent of the debt created
for the money lent ; and that in the latter case, the partnership
creditors would be entitled to payment to the same extent, out of
the individual estate of the partner. .Ex parte Hunter, 1 Atk. 223;
Story on Partn. see. 890.
But this doctrine has long since been
overruled; and the contrary appears to be now well settled. In
.Ez parteLodge, 1 Ves. Jr. 166, Lord Thurlow held, that the assignee,
on behalf of the joint estate, could not be entitled to distribution
out of the separate estate of Lodge, for money which he had abstracted
from the partnership, unless he had taken it with a fraudulent

M1URRAY'S ASSIGNEE Ts. ASSIGNEE OF DEVER & MURRAY.

49

infent to augment his separate estate. And in Ex parte RUarris,
2 Ves. & Beam. R. 210, 212; Lord Eldon, said, "There has long
been an end of the law which prevailed in the time of Lord Hardwicke, whose opinion appears to have been, that if the joint estate
lent money to the separate estate of one partner, or if one partner,
lent to the joint estate, proof might be made by the one, or the other,
in each case. That has been put an end to among other principles,
upon this certainly, that a partner cannot come in competition with
separate creditors of his own, nor as to the joint estate with the joint
creditors. The consequence is, that if one partner lends £1,000 to
the partnership, and they become insolvent in a week, he cannot be
a creditor of the partnership, though the money was supplied to the
joint estate; so if the partnership lends to an individual partner,
there can be no proof for the joint against the separate estate ; that
is, in each case, no proof to affect the creditors, though the individual partners may certainly have the right against each other.
This doctrine proceeds upon the principle, that in the distribution
of the assets of insolvents, the equities of the creditors, whether joint
or separate, must be worked out through the medium of the partners;
that creditors can only step into the shoes of their immediate debtors
in reaching their effects where there are conflicting claims; and that
inasmuch as an individual partner could not himself come in and
compete with the partnership creditors, who were in fact his own
creditors, in the distribution of the fund, and thereby prejudice those
who were not only creditors of the partnership but also of himself:
therefore the separate creditors of a partner could not enforce any
claim to a distributive share of the joint effects against the partnership creditors, which could not have been enforced by the partner
himself for his own benefit. Story on Partn. sec. 890. The rule,
however, that these several funds are to be thus administered as
they stood at the time of the insolvency, is to be received with this
important limitation, that it does not apply either, where the
effects obtained creating the debt, were taken from the separate
estate to augment the joint estate, or from the joint estate to augment the separate estate, fraadulenty,or under circumstances from
which fraud may be inferred, or under which it would be implied.
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In the case before us, however, it is not pretended that the firm
obtained the borrowed money from Murray improperly. The separate creditors, of Murray, therefore, are not, on account of this claim
for money lent by Murray to -the firm, entitled to participate with
the partnership creditors in the distribution of the joint effects.
Judgment of the common pleas reversed; and ordered that
the separate effects of Peter Murray he distributed pro rata first
among his individual creditors, before any application thereof be
made to the payment of the partnership debts of Dever and Murray;
and that the partnership effects be applied first to the payment of
the partnership debts, irrespective of the claim of the partner Peter
Murray, for money lent by him to the firm.

In the Court of Appeals of the State of Nhew York.
THOMPSON, APPELLANT VS. KEEREBER,

RESPONDENT.

I. Where in an action for damages upon an alleged libel, the judge at the trial
instructed the jury that if they found for the plaintiff, the amount of their verdict
was in their absolute discretion, and that such discretion was uncontrolled by
any legal rule or recognized measure of damages, it was held erroneous.
2. The judge should have charged the jury that if they found for the plaintiff, they
should give such nn amount of damages as in their opinion would be an adequate
compensation to the plaintiff for the injury actually sustained by him: and if the
libel originated in malice, in their opinion, they might give such additional damages as they thought would justly punish the defendant.
3. Vindictive or exemplary damages discussed.

This was an action for a libel commenced in October, 1852.
The complaint charges that plaintiff was a practising physician
and surgeon, efigaged in a large business as such; and was also
engaged in selling drugs and medicines ; and that defendant printed
and published of and concerning the plaintiff and of and concerning
his said business, the following malicious libel, to wit: "Strangers
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looking for my office, after night, will be particular to observe my
transparent signs, and be careful not to be deceived by a quack
(plaintiff meaning) who has a small pen in one corner of his establishment under my dispensary, with doctor's office printed on
the window blinds, calculated to deceive the unwary." And also,
" one thus particular in describing the locality of my store as an
impostor, not more than the width of a street from me, has been in
the habit of misrepresenting his establishment to strangers as mine."
The defendant put in an answer denying the allegations in the
complaint, except the allegation of the publication of the matters
charged as libelous and justifying the libel.
On the trial, the defendant moved to nonsuit the plaintift upon
the ground-1. That the plaintiff bad not proved he was a practising physician and surgeon, druggist and apothecary. 2. That the
words of the alleged libel were not of themselves actionable, and
could only be so as they affected the professional character and
business of the plaintiff; and 3. That no special damages had been
alleged, and none proved. The court refused to nonsuit the plaintiff, and the defendant excepted. The plaintiff, on the trial, offered
to prove by one Plomer, that the defendant had threatened to drive
the plaintiff out of town by those means; this evidence was objected
to but admitted ; the witness testified that the defendant said he
would drive the plaintiff out of town, and that the plaintiff was no
physician. The court charged the jury, "that if they found a verdict for the plaintiff they had a right to give such damages as they
in their sound judgment and discretion should think to be right and
proper ;" to which the defendant excepted. The defendant requested the court to charge the jury that they could not give the
plaintiff damages for injuries to his private reputation and character;
and could give damages only for such injuries as he had sustained
in his business and in his professional character as a physician,
surgeon, druggist and apothecary; and that the plaintiff could not
recover vindictive damages, and could only recover damages actually
sustained in his business, &c., and that the words charged, &c., to
be actionable, must relate to the business and character of the
plaintiff, &c. The court refused to charge as requested, and the
defendant excepted.
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
PAIGE, J.-The printed handbill set forth in the complaint and
admitted in the answer to have been published by the defendant,
was libelous. It was a censorious writing, tending to expose the
plaintiff to public hatred and contempt. 3 Johns. Ca. 354; 9
Johns. 215, 1 Den. 347; 7 Cow. 613. It is alleged in the complaint that it was published of and concerning the plaintiff, and of
and concerning his business as a practising physician and surgeon,
and as a druggist and apothecary, and it charges him with being a
quack, who had a small pen under the defendant's dispensary; and
an impostor, who had been in the habit of misrepresenting his own
establishment to strangers as the defendant's. These words are
disgraceful to the plaintiff in his profession as a physician, and in,
his trade and business as a druggist and apothecary. They charge
him with ignorance of his profession and want of integrity in conducting his business. Bacon's Abr., Slander, b. 4, section 2; 6
Cow. 88, 89. The evidence was sufficient to authorize the judge to
submit to the jury the question whether the plaintiff was a practising physician and surgeon ; and also the question whether the libel
was written and published of and concerning the plaintiff in his
profession and business.
The objection to the evidence offered to be proved by Plomer
was properly overruled. The offer was substantially to prove that
the defendant had threatened to drive the plaintiff out of town by
means of the publication of the alleged libel. This evidence was
proper to show the quo animo the libel was published. 19 Wen.
296; 8 Wen. 602, 608-9. There is no exception to the testimony
actually given by Plomer. If the proof did not come up to the
offer, the defendant would have moved to strike it out. The principal question in the case arises on the charge of the judge, and on
his refusal to charge as requested, in respect to the measure of
damages. The judge charged the jury that if they found a verdict
for the plaintiff, they had a right to give such damages as they in
their sound judgment and discretion should think to be right and
proper; and he refused to charge, that the plaintiff could not recover vindictive damages, or damages for injuries to his private
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reputation and character ; and that he could only recover damages
for injuries sustained in his business and professional character, as
a physician, surgeon, druggist and apothecary.
I do not think that the judge erred in refusing to charge, that the
plaintiff could not recover damages for injuries to his private reputation and character. The complaint charges that the libel was
published of and concerning the plaintiff, and of and concerning his
business as a practising physician, and as a druggist and apothecary.
The libel was calculated to injure the plaintiff, in his private character as well as in his business and professional character, as a physician, and apothecary. It was published both of and concerning him
in his private character, and of and concerning his business. It
charges him with ignorance in his profession and want of personal
integrity in his business. These charges are disgraceful to him in
his private character, as well as injurious to him in his business, and
tend to expose him to public hatred and contempt.
Damages are compensatory or exemplary, otherwise denominated
:,nitory or vindictive. A plaintiff is not justly entitled to receive
fiom the defendant damages, as a compensation beyond the extent
of his injury; nor ought the defendant to be required to pay to the
plaintiff more than he is entitled to receive. 2 Greenl. Ev. sec. 266.
It is quite clear that the ancient common law never allowed the
injured party to recover, in addition to an adequate compensation
for the whole injury sustained, damages by way of punishment to
the wrongdoer. 2 Parson on Cont, pp. 446, 447. Damages were
not originally designed for any such purpose. Id. p. 448. This is
apparent from the common law distinction between private and
public wrongs, and the distinct and dissimilar proceedings provided
by the common law for the redress of the former and the punishment of the latter. If we intend to maintain the harmony of the
law, we must preserve the fundamental distinction between civil
injuries, and crimes and misdemeanors, and between civil and criminal actions; and we must confine each of these classes of actions to
ti'eir appropriate office; civil actions to the redress of civil injuries;
and criminal actions to the punishment of public offences. If we
,co.nfound these distinct remedies for private and public wrongs, com-
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pensation for a civil injury will necessarily lose its due measure of
proportion to the injury sustained; and punishment for the public
offence by subjecting the wrong-doer to a double punishment will be
most likely to exceed the limits of a just retribution. In all cases,
a crime or misdemeanor includes a private injury. Every public
offence is also a private wrong. It affects an individual as well as
the community. Thus a robbery is not only a wrong to the -whole
community, but also an injury to private property. So an assault
and battery, and a libel, are not only public offences as being or
tending to a breach of the public peace, but also injurious to the
person of the party assaulted or libeled. In cases of felony at common
law, the civil remedy, of the party injured, was not merged but only
suspended until the offender had been tried. 3 1. Com. 6, note 8;
Christian notes 1 Chit. P1. 150, Springf. ed. 1847; arimson vs.
"Woodfall, 2 Car. &P. 41 and note in 12 Com. Law R. 20. Under
the revised statutes, the right of action of the person injured by a
felony is not merged in the felony. 2 Rev. St. 292.
The doctrine of exemplary damages has not been applied in a
civil action for the private injury, in cases of felony; but its application seems to have been confined to civil actions, for compensation
for private injuries, in cases of misdemeanors, and in other cases, of
an aggravated character, not punishable by indictment, but where
there is oppression or gross negligence, or moral turpitude, or atrocity in the defendants' conduct, or where he has been influenced in
the perpetration of the injury by malice.
Although the private wrong should be also a public offence, the
injured party has no just claim to any penalty imposed upon the
vrong-doer, as a punishment for the public offence, that is the reparation the latter makes to the public for his violation of his public
duties; duties due to the whole community. If the private wrong
is also a public wrong, the prevention of which the interest of the
community demands, but which the criminal law does not condemn,
the legislature should supply the defect by declaring it a public
offence. The defect of the criminal law should not be attempted to
be remedied by punishing the public 'wrong in a civil action for
the private injury by allowing the plaintiff to recover more than he
is entitled to receive.
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The doctrine of vindictive damages stands upon no ground of principle. It diverts the civil action from its legitimate purpose, by allowing the plaintiff to recover a compensation beyond the extent of his
injury; to which he is not entitled; it confounds the distinction
between public and private remedies, and the established proceedings
to enforce them; and it disregards the legal meaning of the term
" damages." The legal meaning of this word, is a pecuniary compensation, recompense, or satisfaction given to the plaintiff for an injury
actually received from the defendant. 2 Greenl. Ev. see. 253;
2 Par. on Con. p. 432; Tidd. Prac. 798; Bacon Abr. tit. Damages.
"Damna," says Lord Coke, "hath a special signification for the recompense that is given by the jury to the plaintiff for the wrong the
defendant hath done unto him." Co. Lit. 257, a. To be a recompense or satisfaction for the injury, they should be precisely commensurate with the injury, neither more or less. 2 Greenl. Ev.sec. 253;
2 131. Coin. 438. In Bockwood vs. Allen, 7 Mass. 256, Sedgwick,
speaking of the measure of damages, says, "it is a sound rule of law
that where an injury has been sustained, the remedy shall be commensurate to the injury sustained."
-Damageis defined in Webster, "the estimated equivalent for
detriment or injury sustained." 1 Bouvier Law Dic. p. 403, defines
damages to be the indemnity given by law to be recovered from
the wrong doer by a person who has sustained an injury either in
his personal property, or relative rights in consequence of the acts
of another. Blackstone says, in the case of injury to personal chattels, as hunting a man's deer, poisoning his cattle, &c., he shall
recover damages in proportion to the injury which he proves his
property has sustained. 3 131. Com. 153.
But it is doubtless true that there are numerous English cases,
and many in the courts of this State and of our sister States, and
of the United States which sanctioned the doctrine, that in a civil
action for libel, slander, assault and battery, false imprisonment,
malicious prosecution, seduction, and the like, damages in addition
to those necessary to compensate the plaintiff for his actual injury
may be awarded to him as a punishment to the defendant, and to
operate as an exemple to deter others from committing the like
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offence. Huokle vs. Honey, 2 Wil. 205; 3 John. Rep. 63; 66;
14 John. 852 &c. 13 How. 363; 2 Par. on Cont. 449 and cases
cited in notes, Sedg. on Dam. 38 to 44. This principle was laid
down by the Supreme court in Tillotson vs. Cheetam, 3 John. 56,
in West vs. Jenkins, 14 John. 352; Brissee vs. M2layber, 21 Wen.
144; Cook vs. -Ellis, 6 Hill 466 ; in Whitney vs. Hitchcock, 4 Den.
563; and by the late Chancellor, in King vs. Boot, in court of Errors,
4 Wen. 139. The decisions on this subject were reviewed by Judge
Jewell, in Taylor vs. Churoh, in the court of Appeals, 4 Selden,
459, and he came to the conclusion that in actions for injuries to
the person, committed under the:influence of actual malice or with
the intention to injure the plaintiff, the jury in their discretion may
give damages beyond the actual injury for the sake of the example,
damages not only to recompense the sufferer but also to punish the
offender. Three judges in addition to Judge Jewell, expressed their
opinion in favor of this proposition and three against it.
In'Dain vs. Wyohoff, 3 Sol. 192, Judge Gardner examined this
question, and denied the right of a jury in any civil action to award
to the plaintiff punitive or vindictive damages as a punishment of the
defendant for his offence against society. But the other judges
expressed no opinion upon that question. In Kendall vs. Stone,
I Sel. 16, Mr. Hill, in his lucid and sententious points, presents
with great force and clearness the reasons in support of the propotion that this doctrine of punitive damages stands upon no ground
of principle, and why it should be repudiated as an acknowledged
principle of law.
The tendency of recent decisions has been to limit the application
of the rule of vindictive damages. In Whitney vs. Hitchcock, 4
Den. 461, the court refused to allow exemplary damages to be
recovered by a father for an aggravated assault and battery upon
his daughter, whereby he was deprived of her services; and in
Austin vs. Wilson, 4 Cush. 273, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts
denied the right of a plaintiff to recover vindictive damages in an
action for an injury which was punishable by indictment. The rule,
allowing vindictive damages to be recovered, is in most cases practically of but little importance. In nearly all the cases in which
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there is such malice, or oppression, or gross negligence, or such
moral turpitude, or atrocity in the defendant's conduct, as to justify
the giving of exemplary damages, there is some insult or injury to
the feelings, some circumstances of indignity and contumely, under
which the wrong was committed; and consequent public disgrace to
the plaintiff and loss of reputation, producing mental agony, for
which the damages cannot be assessed by any definite rule. And
in all such cases the discretion of the jury in fixing the amount of
the damages as a compensation for the injury is so large and undefined, that the sum awarded will generally be as great as if they
were expressly instructed that they were at liberty to give exemplary
damages as a punishment to the defendant and an example to deter
others from committing similar wrongs, my conclusion is, that the
doctrine of punitive damages, stands upon no ground of principle,
and ought to be entirely repudiated; and that the judge therefore
erred in not charging the jury as requested, that the plaintiff could
not recover vindictive damages. But conceding the plaintiff's right
in this case to recover exemplary damages, I think that the judge's
charge on that subject was erroneous. He charged the jury that
they had a right if they found for. the plaintiff, to give such damages as they in their sound judgment and discretion should think to
be right and proper. In this charge he substantially instructs the
jury that the amount of the verdict is in their absolute discretion,
and that they are bound by no rule, and restricted within no limits
in determining what that amount should be; I do not think I use
language which is too strong. For if a judge instructs a jury, that
they may give such damages as they, in their discretion, shall think
proper, it is in effect saying, that they are at liberty to give the
plaintiff whatever amount they please, uncontrolled by any legal rule
or measure of damages, and without reference either to what would
be an adequate compensation for the injury, or a just punishment
of the defendant. I think, under the doctrine of vindictive damages,
that the judge should have specially charged the jury that, if they
found a verdict for the plaintiff, they should give such an amount
of damages as in their opinion would be an adequate compensation
to the plaintiff for the injury actually sustained by him; and that

58

HURDLE vs. HANNER.

in their discretion they were at liberty in case the evidence satisfied
them that the publication of the libel originated in the actual malice
of the defendant to give such additional amount, as would in their
opinion be a just punishment of the defendant, and be sufficient as
an example to deter others from committing a similar offence.
The judge, in not giving such a charge and in charging the jur r
that the plaintiff had a right to recover such damages as they in
their discretion should think to be right and proper, in my judgment,
committed an error. My conclusion therefore is, that the judgment
should be reversed; but my brethren being of a different opinion,
it will be affirmed.

In the Supreme Court of N orth Carolina, June Term, 1858.
GEORGE HURDLE, ASSIGNEE, &c. vs. ORPHEUS S. HANNER.'
A set-off can properly be pleaded only where the parties are the same and the
debts mutual.

This was an action of debt on a note tried before his honor judge
Manly, at fall term 1857, of Alamance Superior Court, plea set-off.
The plaintiff proved the execution of a note, payable to one James Al.
Klapp, for $500, and its endorsement after due to himself for value.
The defendant affirmed in evidence under his plea of set-off a note
payable to himself and signed by the said James M. Klapp, and one
Holt, who were partners in trade. This was objected to by the
plaintiff, and ruled out by the court. To which ruling the defendant
excepted. There was a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff and
appeal by the defendant.
'Perhaps to the better understanding of the case it should be stated, that by
virtue of a statute in North Carolina, an action of debt may be maintained by the
indorser of a note; also that by numerous decisions of our Supreme Court, one who
takes a note after it is due, takes it subject to all the equities which attached to
it in the hands of the payee, including set-offs. It will also be perceived that we
have a statute, by force of which all contracts are practically joint and several. Its
material terms as affecting this case are quoted in the opinion of the court.-Reporter.
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No counsel appeared for the plaintiff.
TV. ff. Bailey, for the defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PEARSON, J.-A set-off is a cross action by the defendant against
the plaintiff which is allowed by statute to avoid a multiplicity of
suits where the debts are mutual, that is, where the parties are the
same and the debts are due in the same right. Accordingly in
Vorth vs. Bentress, 1 Dev. 419, to a plea of set-off the plaintiff
was allowed to rely upon several matters of defence by way of
replication, which could only be done under the statute of Ann which
permits several defences to be made by plea but does not extend to
the replication , by treating the plea of set-off as an action on the
part of the defendant. So in Wharton vs. Hopkins, 11 Ired. 505,
to a plea of set-off against the assignee of the plaintiff, he was
allowed to rely upon a set-off which the assignor was entitled to
against the defendant by way of replication. "In all cases of joint
obligations or assumptions of copartners in trade or others, suits
may be brought against all or any number of the persons making
such obligations, assumptions or agreements." Rev. Code, oh. 31,
sec. 84. If the defendant had sued Klapp alone on the note given by
h-im and I-olt before Klapp had transferred the note in controversy
to the plaintiff, there can be no doubt that he (Klapp,) could have
relied upon i. by way of set-off. It follows that if Klapp had sued
the defendant on the note in controversy, he might have relied on
the note of Klapp and Holt by way of set-off, because he had the
right to sue Klapp alone and the set-off is a cross action between
the same parties. As the note was assigned to the plaintiff after
1Y.aturity, it was subject to the same defence that could have been
m.ade to it while it was held by the assignor. The case of the State
JBank vs. Armstrong and others, 4 Dev. 519, was cited as opposed
to this conclusion. We do not think so. The original action was
brought against five obligors and it was held that one of the defendants could not rely upon a debt due to him alone by the plaintiff
as a set-off, on the ground that in the cross action the parties were
not the same as in the original action. We admit that if the defen-
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dant had sued Klapp and Holt jointly on the note due him, then
Klapp according to that case, if it be correctly decided, could not
have used the note due to him alone by the defendant, as a set-off
because there would have been different parties to the original and
cross action. But no such difficulty is presented as our case stands.
The original suit is by Hurdle, who stands in the place of Klapp,
against the defendant and the cross action or set-off is by the defendant against Klapp. So the parties in both are the same and the
circumstance that the defendant has also a several cause of action
against Holt on the same note does not affect the principle. There
is error.
Judgment reversed and a venire de novo awarded.

In the Supreme Court of North Carolina, June Term, 1858.
ADAMS VS. HEDGPETH.
A bail bond taken by the sheriff which omits the name of the security in the body
of it, although signed and sealed by him, is a void bond, and cannot be enforced.

This was a scire facias to subject the defendant as bail to be
entered in Orange County Court, and carried by appeal to the
Superior Court where it was tried before his honor Judge Saunders
at the March term, 1858.
The facts are as follows; the plaintiff sued out his writ to
August term, 1856 of Orange County Court, against William H.
Campbell, George Jackson, and Pride Jones; at the return term
the sheriff filed two bail bonds, one signed by Pride Jones with
one Strayhan, as his bail, conditioned for his appearance, the other
was signed and sealed by the said Campbell, Jackson and the present defendant, and is in these words, viz.
STATE or NORTH CAROLINA,

Orange County.
Know all men by these presents, That we, Win. H. Campbell and George Jackson,
all of the County aforesaid, are held and firmly bound unto Richard M.
Jones, sheriff of Orange County, as such sheriff in the just and full sum of seven hundred dollars, current money of the State aforesaid to be paid unto the said Richard M.
and -
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Jones, sheriff as aforsaid, as such sheriff, his heirs, executors or assigns, for the true
performance whereof we bind ourselves, our heirs, executors, administrators and
assigns, jointly and severally, firmly by these presents.

Sealed with our seal and

dated this the 19th day of August, 1856.
The condition of the above obligation is such, that if the above bounden Win. H.
Campbell, George Jackson, who have been arrested by the said Richard M. Jones,
sheriff as aforesaid, upon a writ returnable to the County Court for Orange County,
at the suit of Thomas Adams, do well and truly make his appearance at the next
1iMonday of August
County Court to be held for the County of Orange, on the 4th
1356, then and there to answer to the said Thomas Adams of a plea that they render unto him the sum of three hundred dollars, which they owe and from him detain,
to his damige fifty dollars, and then and there to stand to and abide by the judgment
of the said court, and not depart from the said court, without leave and said
the securi-

of the said Wm.H. Campbell, George Jackson, well and truly discharge

as special bail of the said WIm. H. Campbell, George Jackson, in the said court then
the above obligation to be void, otherwise to remain in full force and effect.
(Signed)

WM. H. CAMPBELL,

(seal.)

GEORGE JACKSON,

(seal.)

A. W. HEDGPETH,

(seal.)

The plaintiffs afterwards obtained judgment in Orange County
Court against Campbell, Jackson and Jones and this sci. fa. was sued
out to subject the present defendant as bail of Campbell, to the payment of said judgment. The defendant at the return term of the sci.
fa. craved oiler, which was had, and then, contending that the above
-was no bail bond, moved in arrest of judgment; which motion was
refused by his honor, and from a judgment according to the scire
facias the defendant prayed for and obtained an appeal to the Supreme
Court.'
I By section

1 of chapter 11 Rev. Code, it is enacted that when a capias ad respon-

dendum, 4-c., comes to the hands ofany sheriff, it sballbe his duty to "take bond with
sufficient security in double the sum for which such person shall be held in arrest,
&c."

Section 2nd enacts that "upon the return of such bail bond into court, it

shall be deemed, without any indorsement to that effect, to be assigned to the plaintiff therein named." The 3rd section enacts that "bail in civil cases taken according to the directions of this Act, shall be deemed special bail and as such liable to
satisfy the recovery of the plaintiff."

So that it will be perceived that the bail bond

in our practice is equivalent, in its effects to the recognizance of special bail or bail
above in England.

The 19th section of the 105th chapter of the Rev. Code however

governs this case. "The sheriff or his deputy, shall take no obligation of or from
any person in his custody for or concerning any matter or thing relating to his office,
otherwise than payable to himself as sheriff and dischargeable upon the prisoner's
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
BATTLE, J.-There is an objection apparent upon the face of the
instrument declared on as a bail bond which is fatal to its validity as
such, and which is of course decisive of the case against the plaintiff,
without reference to any other objection. The name of the defendant is not only not inserted in the body of the bond, but it is not
stated in the condition that he is the special bail of the principal
obligors. His name and seal do indeed appear at the bottom of the
appearance and rendering himself at the day and place required in the writ whereupon he was, or shall be taken or arrested, and his sureties discharging themselves
therefrom as special bail of such prisoner or such person keeping within the limits
and rules of any prison; and every other obligation taken by any sheriff in any other
manner or form, by color of his office, shall be void," &c.
It was held in an early case that a bail bond need not have a condition for the
discharge of the bail, as this right in this respect is acknowledged and regulated by
a public law. Rhodes vs. Vaughan, 2 Hawks, 167. But it was held necessary in
that case as well as the subsequent case of Clark vs. Walker, 3 Ired. 181, that in
order to constitute a bail bond under our statutes, the relation of principal and bail
must appear in the condition of the bond so that by covering the names of the parties
signing the instrument, the court might see from the bond itself who was principal
In the principle case it cannot be determined upon a reading of the
bond, that Campbell is principal; the condition is, that if "he" do well and truly
make "his" appearance &c., after a former recital that Campbell and George Jackson,
and who bail.

had been arrested. To whom does the pronoun - he" relate? Not to both, because
it is singular, then as between Campbell and Jackson, if you apply the ordinary
grammatical rule, it should be referred to Jackson, which will not answer, as Hedgpeth is sued as bail of Campbell, not as bail of Jackson. Then not to apply that
rule, you are left in a mere state of conjecture from which you cannot be relieved
by any other part of the instrument; Hedgpeth's name is nowhere mentioned. So
that it cannot be determined from the instrument declared on, who is either principal
In Clark vs. Walker, cited supra, Walker was sued as bail of one .Polony.
The condition was "1that" if the above bounden John Polony and John Walker do
"and shall make their personal appearance," &c. The court say that "this is not
or bail.

the contract of bail in its terms, nor can it be inferred from the bond that one is bail
for the other." Nor can the case be helped by the application of the maxim ut res
enagis valeat quamperrat,as it is not a common law bond, but one taken under 26 Hen.
6. AU bonds taken by a sheriff are declared void unless he follows the direction of the
statute. "The statute, in such cases like a tyrant, where he comes he makes all
void."

Twyne's case, 3 Rep. 83, notes u and w.-AVote by Reporter.

